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"The Battle of the Atlantis was the
dominating faotor all through the war.
Never for one moment eould we forget
that everything happening elsewhere,
on land, on sea, or in the air,
,
depended ultimately on its outcome."
- W. S. Churohill

Leyte Gulf, Midway, Coral Sea come to mind when people speak of

naval victories by the United States during World Var II.

It is easy

to glorify these victories, and to forget a victory equally signifi-

cant, the victory over the U-boat in the Atlantic.

Without this

accomplishment, the supply lines to the European theater of operations

could not have been maintained.

"It was but one link in the chain

of forces and events that led to victory over the Axis.

And it was

the central, vital link, without which the chain would have fallen

into two dangling parts, shackled only at eaoh end, neither strong

enough to resist disaster and defeat.'*

2

Although the operations

against the U-boats in World War II are little known today, in

January of 19A2 they were of vitsl importance.

The meeting of the U-boat threat in the Atlantic meant a step
towards the defeat of Germany.

In order to defeat the U-boat, the

United States utilised her military forces, sciences, industry, and
the universities.

The Navy had to initiate a new military coordinating

body, the Tenth Fleet.

To bring industry and the universities together

to produce improved and new weapons, the National Defense Research

1.
2.

Roskill, S. W.,
Hereafter cited
M orison, S. £.,
Hereafter cited

The War at Sea . London, I960, Vol. Ill, I, p. 2A5.
as Roskill, W ar at Sea , III, I.
The Atlantic Battle Won - Boston, 1956, Vol. X, p. 3.
as Morison, Atlantic Battle Won .

viii

Committee was initiated.

Although fighting a naval battle in the

Pecifio, the United States had to defeat the improved U-boat in the

Atlantic.

A complete description of the U-boat battle in the Atlantic is not
necessary, for this has already been done by Samuel E. Moris on, Vioe

Admiral Ruge, and others.

What is lacking is an aoourate account of

the number of U-boats the United States sunk.

accounts given to describe these successes.

There have been many different
The question that is raised

is the aoouraoy of these figures, which were published during the war,

immediately after the war, and those available now.

Although the Atlantic Battle will not be described ss s whole,
some information, such as command structure, policy, and materia^ will be
presented to put the data in perspective.

Where the United States and

Great Britain worked jointly ©r when British policy influenced American
policy, the British policies will be described.

Major emphasis is placed upon the United States public information
policy and whether or not it concurred with the actual battle reports.
In evaluating United States policy the British public information policy
is used for comparison^ and also to illustrate its influence upon United

States policy.

mation.

The public had to rely upon the government for its infor-

Did the United States government accurately inform the public

about the U-boat war in the Atlantic?

The U-boat was defeated.

Unlike the Pacific naval battles, suoh as

Leyte Gulf, Midway, and Coral Sea, the details of the Atlantic battle

have not been clearly described.

was it defeated?

Why was the U-boat defeated?

What was the score for the American successes

How
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I.

COMMAND STRUCTURE AND POLICY

"Their goal was the enemies'
seaborne commerce end not the
enemy fleet. 1
- Eric Raeder
-"

"Maintain the lines of communication to Great Britain and also
future bases.
- Ernest King

The Command Structures and Policies of the opposing navies
determined the nature of the struggle under the sea and therefore
are vitally significant.

The description of the German and United

States Naval structures will not attempt to touch upon all the
complex organisations but will give those that are pertinent to the

U-boat war.

This study should include the organisation of the

navies at the start of the war, any reorganisational changes, or
any organisational additions.

The personnel occupying the key

positions in the naval structures should also be mentioned.

The

British organisation will only include the liaison committees between
the United States and Great Britain.

In this study both the theoreti-

cal structures and the practical working models should be pointed out.

Theoretically, the German military machine had as its leader,
the Fuehrer, with the Armed Force Headquarters, commonly designated
as OKW, as the strategic control body directing the armed forces as
a

whole.

Each of the major services, Air Force, Army, and Navy had

representatives on the CKW staff.

1.

2.
3.

3

Under the OKW were the headquarters

Raeder, E«, Struggle for the Sea . London, 1959, p. 345. Hereafter
cited as Raeder, Struggle for the Sea .
King, E. J., United States Navy at War. 1941-1945. Washington,
1946, p. 818. Hereafter cited as King, U.S. Navy at War .
Taylor, Tillford, Sword and Swastika . New York, 1952, p. 100-105.
Hereafter cited as Taylor, Sword and Swastika.

2
of the Individual services (Navel High Command).

for the Navy was OKM.

The command agency

General Admiral Raeder held the position of

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from June 1, 1935 to January 30,

194.3.

Prom January 30, 1943 to May 2, 1945, Admiral Doeniti held this position.
When Admiral Doenita took over his new duties as the head of the government, Admiral von Friedeburp became Commander-in-Chief from May 2,
1945 to May 23, 1945.

These are the men who led the German Wavy during

the war.

The Naval Operations Command,
the Nsvy.

SKI.,

controlled the operations of

The Chief-of -Staff of SKL from November 1, 1°38, to June 10,

7941, was Admiral Schni*wind.

Admiral Schniewind was succeeded by

Admiral Frieke on June 11, 1941.

February 20, 1943.

Admirsl Fricke's term lasted until

Admiral. Meisel succeeded Fricke on February 2,

and held the post until April 30, 1944.

On May 1, 1944, the Chief-of-Staff

of SKL was changed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Seekriegslutung).

1943

(Der Chief der

Admiral Meisel oontinued in this capacity until

May 22, 1945.
The senior submarine officer was Admirsl Doenitt.

Admiral Doenita

was Leader of Submarines from January 1936 to September 11, 1941.^

From

September 12, 1941 to Msy 1, 1945, Doenita held the position of

Commander of Submarines (Befchlshsber der TJnterseeboote),

s

change

of status which reflected the increasing importance of the sub-

marine in Germany's naval effort.

Thus, from the first, the command

of the submarine fleet was in the hands of Admiral Doenitt.

From

February 1, 1943, much of the task of conducting the submarine

l~.

Von Seigles, F. F., Die Hohern Deinststellen Der Deutschen Wllsmacht .
1933-1945 . Munchen, 1953, p. 55. Hereafter citeu as Siegles,
Die Hohern .

3

war was passed to Admiral von Friedeburg as Admiral of Submarines.

This

occurred when Admiral Doenitz became Commander-in-Chief of the German
Navy, without relinquishing his previous functions.

The U-boat fleet was organised into flotillas.
mately eighteen fighting flotillas.
for the training of officers and men.

There were approxi-

There were several more flotillas
5

Several flotillas were also used

for the purposes of testing new equipment.

Naval Commands were also set up to govern various areas.

These

Nsval Commands originally consisted of Command West and Command North
As new territories were conquered, additional Navel Commands were

Sea.

Command Norway was organised on April 10, 1940, and Command

necessary.
I

1

-..-a

x

-1

v.-:

*.

.

r

Pubs 20

1940.

6

'asss were, bhs commands

involved in the submarine war with the Western Allies.

Through them

the SKL directed the U-boat activities.

Ranged against Doenits and his staff were the anti-submarine commands
of Britain and the United States, of which only the latter is relevant.

From the start of hostilities in Europe, the United States began to
organize for war.

The United States Navy Department was placed under

the control of Frank Knox in June, 1940.

At this time, the office of

Under Secretary of the Navy was created, with James V. Forrestal as
the first incumbent.

Admiral Harold R. Stark held the position of Chief

of Naval Operations.

Admiral King became Commander-in-Chief Atlantic

Fleet on February 1, 1940, or in naval terminology Cinclant.

Admiral

King became Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet (Comieh) on December 20,
1941.

5~.

6.
7.

The position of Chief of Naval Operations was given to Admiral

Lohmann and Hildebrand, Die Deutsohe Kriegsmarine 1939-1945 Bad Nauheim,
1956, Vol. I, Chap. 71, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Lohmann and Hildebrand,
Die Deutsche .
Siegles, Die Hohern . p. 61.
Morison, S. E., The Battle of the Atlantic . Boston, 1947, Vol. I, p. 115.
Hereafter cited as Morison, Battle of the Atlantic.
.

King In mid-March 1942.

Admiral Stark was appointed Commander United

States Naval Forces Europe (Comnarere) on January 1, 1942.

Vice Admiral

Ingersoll became Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet.

Admiral Sing as Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet and Admiral Ingersoll
as Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet were confronted with the necessity

of eliminating the U-boat.

Several sections of Admiral King' s staff

were incorporated to direct the anti-submarine operations.

Rear Admiral

R. S. Edwards wes in oharge of anti-submarine problems and coordinating

the various staff sections, especially convoy and routing, headed by

Admiral Metcalf .

Captain Wilder D. Baker was in charge of anti-submarine
m

tactics and preparations.

Admiral Stark started various defensive

sections, called Sea Frontiers, each extending 200 miles into the Atlantic.

The Eastern Frontier was commanded by Admiral Andrews, later succeeded by

Vice Admiral Leary.

The Gulf >one was originally commanded by Admiral

Hunroe, who was succeeded by Admiral Anderson.

Admiral Cook, then Admiral Giffin in charge.

The Caribbean sone had
The Panama Frontier was

run by Admiral Train, who was followed by Admiral Kingman.

Expansion

of the Frontiers resulted in the Moroccan Frontier, with Commanore McCandlish
as senior officer.

In October 1942, the Army formed the Army Air Force Anti-Submarine

Command (AAFAC) to complement the bombing of the RAF and the Eighth Air
Its headquarters were situated in New York City.
o
sisted of two wings, the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth.

Force.

The unit conThus, the

Army was also working to defeat the U-boat.

8.

9.

King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King . New York, 1952, p. 450.
flo ral King .
Hereafter cited as King and Whitehall,
War
II, Chicago, 1949,
World
Air
Forces
.
and
Cate,
The
Armv
Craven
Vol. II, p. 1. Hereafter cited as Craven and Cate. AAF. WW II .

5

Ob May 20, 1943, the

Fleet without e •hip," hots appropriately

termed the Tenth Fleet, was Inaugurated to help expedite the fight
against the U-boat threat.

10

Admiral King, along with hia many other

duties, became Commander Tenth Fleet.
of steff.

Admiral Low becane hia chief

The Tenth Fleet waa broken down Into five divisions.

These

divisions included the Operatione Division, Anti-Submarine Measures
Division, including the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operational Research
Group, the Civilian Scientific Council, and the Air Anti-Submarine

Development Unit Atlantic Fleet (Airasdivlent).

11

The Convoy and

Routing Diviaion was taken over intect from Cominch headquarters.
Thus, with the introduction of the Tenth Fleet the United States Navy

was at laat organised to prosecute the war againet the U-bcat in a

methodical manner.
In view of theae operations in the same waters, the United Statea

Navy and the Royal Navy had to keep each other well informed on policy,
intelligence, and operations.

Therefore, liaison committees were created.

Captain L. Hewlett The baud, United States Naval Control Officer at
Londonderry, Ireland, had initially this task for the United Statea.

12

At the Caaablanca Conference on January 19, 1943 . the first improvements
in organisation appeared with the establishment of the Allied Anti-Submerine

Survey Board on March 8.

Although not exectly lleison, it did prepare for

cooperation between the two navies.

Rear Admiral Kauffmen pre a idea, with

the other United States member being Commander John Vest.

13

The British

members were Rear Admiral Mansfield and Group Captain Canning (RAF).

10.
11.
12.
13.

Kinf and Whitehall, FJee' AdrnJ^aJLJUait P»
Morieon, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 24,
Ibid., p. 12.
Ibid., p. 12

&2.

6

This Committee was to

'Bake a survsy of all matters relating to snti-

submerine warfare In tha Atlantic OceesV

^

Another organiaetlon developed at thla tine was the Combined Procedures
Board.

The American representative waa Captain Vest.

Thla board* a duty

waa to aevise a single ayatem of procedures end eignsls for the navies
engaged in warfare againat the U-boat.
could not

corns to

any conclusions.

The board nst in June, 1943 , but

Therefore, the United States end

Crest Britain went on to develop their own systems and policies for defeeting
1
the U-boat snd countering German nsvsl policy which governed the U-bost. ^

All the German Nsvsl Commands had to look to the Commander-in-chief,
end SKL for instructions relating to opsrstions within the command areas.
A

small circls in SKL, directed by Genersl Admirsl Reeder and later

Admiral Dosnlts, made the decisions.

Their policy-making group included

Admirsl Schniewind, Admiral Fricke, Frigetenkepi tan Wagner, and the head
of Reader' a paraonal ataff, Fregetenkspitsn Sehulte-Monting.l

0

Theae men

were involved in advialng the Fuehrer, on what policies and dscisions should
be made.

SKL recommended policy, Hitler determined it, both before and

after the outbreak of war.

There appears to have been s significant neglect of naval affairs in
Hitler' a pre-war policies.

supremacy at ass.

Hitler's policy appears to recognise the British

Therefore, Germany should rssoh sn alliance with Great

Brltsin, allowing Germany freedom of action elsewhere.

In 1924, Hitler,

criticising German policy toward England in 19H, showed this fsvoritism
for England.
favour."'

17

"

'No sacrifice should have been too greet to win England's

In 1933, Hitler lsid down his initisl dictum.

"'The bssis

U~.~Ib43 . , p. 12.
15.
16.
17.

See Appendix I for British Orgsnisstions.
Bskker, CD., Defeat at Sea r Nsw York, 1955, p. 73. Hereeftsr citsd
ee Bskker, Pefest at Sag.
Hereefter
Hinaley, F. H., Hitler' Strategy. Cembridge, 1951. p.
cited as Hinsley, HJ^sr's Strs*fgy.

7
for future German navel policy,

according to Reader,

"

'was hla strong

dsterminstion to live in peace with Italy, Japan, and England.'"

™

In

1935, Hitler sttsmptsd to plaaae England by negotiating the Anglo-German

Naval Agreement, with the naval proportion of 35s 100 in favor of Great

Britain.

A stipulation was alao aade that Germany could equal British

submarine construction.

Hitler had at thie tine alao aettled the queation

of the type of fleet Germany should have, choceing the balanced fleet.

Only after the Munich Agreement in the autumn of 1938, according to
Reader, did Hitler feel the realetanoe of England, and ordered a tremendous

construction progress,

Alao at this tine Hitler decided to step up U-boat

construction from s ratio of 45? of British construction to IOCS

19

With Hitler's asaurance that there would be no war with England until
1944 or 1945, Admiral Raeder in September, 1938, drew up the

future naval construction.

20

"

V

plan for

With the detea 1^44 and 1945 in mind, the

plan called for a balanced fleet.

Six heavy bet t las hips, ei^ht heavy

cruisers, seventeen licht cruisers, four aircraft carriers , and 221 U-boats

ware to be completed by 1948.

With this balanced fleet attacks could be

carried out against British merchant shipping, the British heavy forcea

diaparaed in defenae of trade could be attacked, and the British Home
Fleet could be tied down.

21

With the turn of political events because of the attack on Poland
on September 1, 1939, the

'«2J»

plan had to be scrapped.

The beat policy

under the new circumstances was to attack the Britlah supply lines.
Admiral Raeder, generally considered an advocate of the High Seas Fleet,
atated part of the German Navel Policy on September 3, 1939.

Harrying

the enemies' merchant navy, and the most promising weapon for that purpose

18.
19.
20.

21.

Ibid.. 1)76.
Ibid., p. 7.
Msrtisnssen, Hit 1st snd "jiff &da,lrefte, New York 1940, p. 13.
cited as Marti ens sen, Admirals .
Hineley, Mt ley's PlOTfrgT. P« 2.

Hereefter

3

is the U-boat.

What we need are U-boats and atill sere U-boats

On September I, 1939, in a memorandum to Admiral Reeder, Admiral Doenits

stated

The U-boat is the only way of defeating Britain.

The U-boat

vill always be the backbone of the fleet against England and of political
pressure on her/

23

However, German policy did not solely rely on the

U-boat, but rather the primary objective of the nary was to operate
against the supply lines of the enemy.

50,000,000 tons of supplies annually.

2L

Greet Britain had to import

The German Mary wished to prevent

part of these supplies from reaching their destination.

To aeeomplish this end, the objective of the Navy was to avoid major
actions and to concentrate on merchant shipping.

The overall plan called

for an attack on Allied merchantmen by groups of pocket battleships, light
cruisers, and U-boats.

The super bettleehipe, which were better built then

the British battleships according to Admiral Reader, with superior epeed

end renge, would support the operetlon.

They would engage the enemy, if

neoeaeery, until the raiding force had retired.

Therefore, the ettecka

on aupply lines were theoretically to be carried out by the fleet.

However,

with some notsble except ione, the task in aotuel practice devolved upon
the U-boat.

Up until December,, 1941, German naval policy continued to be attacks
on the sea lanee by U-boats and the High Seaa Fleet.

After the entrance

of the United States into the war, German naval policy depended even more

upon the U-boat to choke the aupply lines to Greet Britain.

Early in

1942, Hitler ordered the surface fleet to Norway, although Reader wished to

continue surface reide on Allied shipping.

22.
23.
24.

Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 21.
Hinaley, Hitler* a Strategy , p. 3.
Mertieneeen, Admirals , p. 13.

With the news on December 30

i.9

that the heavy cruiser, Admiral Hipper , had been damaged. Hitler decided
to deeommiasion all his heavy shipa.

2*5

On January 6, 1943, Admiral Raeder

handed in bla resignation, and Admiral Doenits became Commander-in-Chief
of the German Navy.

26

Although the High Seas Fleet was not decommissioned, the U-boat was

dearly the major weapon against Allied merchantmen.
employed the

"

tying up*

of escort vessels .

27

The

"

Both Hitler and Doenits

tying ujf concept referred

to the number of escort vessels the enemy had to employ to search for U-boats.

Therefore those Allied vessels on U-boat patrol were kept from other
activities.
tonnage."

22

Admiral Doenits alao relied upon another concept,

M

integral

The main task of the U-boat was to sink enemy tonnage without

regard to route, place, or cargo.

The hope was that merchant sinkings would

keep ahead of merchant construction.

Therefore, the German U-boats were

"to sink as much tonnage ss possible with the least losses
concept and the

Integral tonnage*

29

The 'tying up*

concepts were to last until the end of

the war.

German U-boats at sea had to abide by policies which were affected by
the political situation at that particular time.

By the London Pact on

Submarine Wsrfare in 1939, merchant ships could be attacked if guarded

by naval or air forces, or if the vessel were armed.

Merchant shipa,

which resisted an order to atop could alao be destroyed.

Similarly, if

the merchant vessel waa engaged in a naval engagement or was transporting
troops it could be destroyed.

On August U, 1939, Admiral Raeder commanded

U-boats to wage warfare on merchant ships by these rules.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Morison, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 57.
Admiral Raeder' s resignation waa not accepted, be became Inspector General.
Moriaon, Atlantic Battle Won , p. 59.
Ibid. , p. 58.
Ibid., p. 58.

Oarun U-boat commanders
the London Pact reetrictiona.

running without lights.

found it extremely difficult to operate under

They found that Merchant veaaele were

When the Merchant ship vaa atopped, they vould

report the poaition of the U-boat on their vireleaa aeta.

were alao being armed by the British government.
their merchantmen.
Swedish merchantman.

Merchant veaaela

Even neutrals were arming

For example, U-3 was sunk by gunfire from an armed
30

Therefore, the uae of the wireless and armed

merchant ships made the etrict interpretation of the London Pact dangerous
to the safety of the U-boat.

Therefore, on September 23, 1939, R seder ssked Hitler for permission
to attack ships sending wireless messr

a giving the locetion of the U-bost.

Clearance was also asked to sink armed merchant vessels.

On November 22,

1939, Admiral Header pressed Hitler fas peradsai.a to sink neutrsl ships,

especially Greek ships owned by British companies.
get Hitler to declare a

"

Siege of England."

31

He slso attempted to

Thia would free the U-bost

from any restrictions st all.
On October U» 1939, Hitler gsve the order to fire on merchsntmsn who

used their wireless sets after being detained.
from these orders.

Neutral ships were excluded

In mid-October, 1939, Hitler approved the sinking of

enemy merchant vessels without warning.

It was assumed thst they were armed.

On October 16, 1939, Hitler after vacillating, again gave hia permiaalon

to sink passenger ships in convoys.

32

Hitler denied permission to attack
33

neutrsl ships and refused to declare e "Siege of England."-"

Hitler did

not want to offend the neutrals, because of his excursion into the Low

Countries .

He did not wish to offend the neutrals before he was reedy

30. Doenlts. Cerl. Ten Years snd Twenty Days . New Turk, 1959, p. 51.
Hereafter cited es Doenitz, Ten Years .
31. Hinsley, Hitler* s Strstegr . p. 33.
32. Martienasen, Admirals , p. 26.
33. Hinsley, Hitler* a Strategy, p. 33

to attack then.

On February 23, 1940, Hitler had denied permission for Admiral

Raeder to send U-boats to the Halifax area.

"psychological effect on the U.S. A."

3Z.

He refused because of the

However, when the United States

on September 1, 1941, began escorting convoys from Newfoundland to

Iceland, Raeder again appealed for freedom of action.

"

'There is no

longer any difference between American and British ships.'"
ment came on September 11, 1941.

J

This state-

The Fuehrer rejected this appeal but

left the door open for attacks on American shipping.

There would be

no outright attacks upon United States warships or merchant ships,

even American ships in British convoys.
n

'I

However, Hitler compromised.

will never call a U-boat commander to account if he torpedoes an

American ship by mistake .'••^
Admiral King probably stated United States prewar policy best on
April 18, 1941*

"Entrance into the Western Hemisphere is viewed as

possibly actuated by an unfriendly interest toward shipping or territory
in the Western Hemisphere."^

The lines. of demarcation started at 20°W

including all of Greenland, the Azores Islands, the whole of the Gulf of the
St. Lawrence, the Bahamas, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico.

Therefore, the United States was committed to the protection of these

waters against any U-boat threat.

When the United States entered the war, two conflicting anti-U-boat
policies were brought forward.

Its solution was the price of effective

between the Army and Navy.
defensive measures.

34.
35.
36.
37.

The policies revealed a major difference

The Army, its chief exponent being General Arnold,

Ibid..,"pT59.
Martienssen, Admirals p. 118.
Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy , p. 173.
Morison, Battle of the Atlantic , p. 14.
,

>2

wished to follow the British practice, like the RAF's Coastal Command.
This practice consolidated all anti-submarine aircraft under the command
of the Air Poroe.

On January 14, 1942, the Navy requested the Army Air

Force to hand over two-engine and four-engine bombers to Navy crews.

General Arnold refused the request.

"The AAF is to ODerate land-based

aircraft against suitable targets, wherever found ."-^
of Army policy came from General C. W. Russell.

The best statement

The most important objec-

tive would be the bombing of sub pe>ns and yards with long range air coverage.

The tactic8 in regard to the submarines would be limited to harrying attacks.
On the Naval side, Admiral King held sway.

Hunter-Killer groups.
harrying offense.

He was unimpressed with

He was unimpressed with the Biscay bombing and

The overall plsn should be one of defense, of convoy,

of B'24' s for Pewf oundland .

The policy should be the protection of 7,000

miles of coastal lanes.

The disagreement came to a head with each service going their sepsrate
On May 20, 1943 the Tenth Fleet was formed.

way.

Its msin objectives

included the destruction of enomy submarines and the protection of shipping

The control

along the East coast, in the Gulf, and in the Caribbean Sea.

of convoys, the support of anti-submarine ooerations, and the correlstion
of anti-submarine training and materisl development were among its sssigned

tasks.

The Tenth Fleet would use V«ry Iiong R'ange and Long Range aircraft.

These aircraft could be commanded by the general or flag officer, either
army or navy.^

0

It was difficult to find a place for the Army Air Force

in the Tenth Fleet, since the Army wished e combined air force under an

air force officer and subject to army methods of discipline.^

Admiral King appealed to Generel Mershsll.

38.
39.
40.
41.

1

The Army Air Officer would

King and Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King , p. 452.
Ibid.., p. 452.
King and Whitehall, Fleat Admiral King . p. 205.
Moris on, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 26.

be given commend of Very Long Range and Long Range aircraft. Joint forces
10
would govern the bases.
The final agreement of July 9, 1943* labeled

The Arnold, McNarney, McCain Agreement called for the Army's withdrswal

from this aspect of operations as soon as the Navy was ready.

This agree-

ment integrated the command of aircraft into the Tenth Fleet.

The anti-

submarine B-24's, which the Army handled, would be turned over to the Navy,

in return for Navy B-24's.

The Navy would be responsible for off-shore

patrols, reconnaissance, and the protection of ehipping.

The Army would

be responsible for shore bases required for defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Long Range Navy patrol planes would be used in addition to the

fleet wings for patrol and reconnaissance.

Nothing was to be done to

interfere with the command, either Army or Navy.

Thus, the AAFAC died.

Overall policy was reviewed at the Casablanca Conference in January,

The first Allied objective would be the bombing of factories in

1943.

Europe.

The next step would be the bombing of plants In which U-boats

were assembled.

The bombing of bases at Lorent and Brest would follow.

Further down the list could be found tracking of submarines at sea, and
the convoying of ships.
It can be seen that the Army wished to use Long Range aircraft to

hit factories and plants.

air and sea power.

The Navy wished to protect the convoys with

The overall strategy leaned more towards the use of

Long Range and strategic bombing, as can be seen at the Casablanca Conference.

President Roosevelt showed a tendency eo interfere and intervene
in the details of naval affairs.

For example, he acquiesced to Admiral

Stark's and King's request for permission to use patrol boats (PC's)^

42.
A3.

Craven and Cate, AAF. WWII, p. 392.
Ibid., p. A09.

.

.

u
•ub chasers (SC's) and das tr oyer escorts ss tha best nethoda of defense
and convoy

duty.^ Thia clearly ahowa Preaident Rnoaevelt'a tendency

to look after details in the naval program.

With the organisation, policiee,

and peraonnel, the United Statea Navy vaa ready tr meet the challenge of
the German U-boat and German naval policies.

Hitler decided German naval policy.

Hia advia ore, under the guidance

of Admiral Reader, end later Admiral Doenits, formulated the policies

Before the war major emphasis vaa placed upon the use of a balanced fleet,
in order to attack the aea lanes leading to Great Britain.

After

December, 1941, and the failure to achieve successes with surf see units,

German naval policy depended more upon the U-boet as the chief weapon
against the enemy.

The use of the U-boat aa the major weapon againat the

Allied supply linea, presented the United Statea with the problem of

defense
President Roosevelt, along with General Marahall and Admiral King
conatructed the policies which would be employed againat the U-boat.

Navy created a new coordinating body, the Tenth Fleet.

The

The Army withdrew

from patrols, reconnaiaeance, end the protection of ehipping.^ However,
the Tenth Fleet waa engaged primarily in defense.

The overall policy

incorporated in January, 1943, called for an offeneive againat factoriea,
and U-boat pens on the mainland.

The Germane developed an attack against the supply linea.

The

United Statea chose to take the offenaive, instead of meeting the U-boat
in iaolated operations, and inoreaaingly aet the tone of the naval war,
at leaat on the eaatern aeaboard and ita environa.

U.
45.

Jane' a Fighting Shine 19A3-AA. New York, 1944, p. 467.
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II.

MATERIAL
"

I will show that U-boats alone can
win this war." 1

- Admiral Doenits

The battle between the U-boat and anti-submarine forces became a
battle of new weapons, location devices, and materials.

The U-boat was

improved and given new arms and equipment as it met more effective resistance.

The Allies countered with new vessels, location devices, and weapons.

The German command then countered with new receiving devices, newer U-boats,
and new weapons.

Thus, the battle of material was one of blow and counter-

blow, attack ana party.

In the discussion on the battle of material, it i3 necessary to under-

stand the characteristics of the U-boat.
olsss torpedo carrier.

The U-boat was considered a flrst-

It was suitable for mine laying operations, such as

the laying of mines in Chesapeake Bay.

with other naval vessels.

2

of the U-boat is increased.

It was not suited for joint action

Its fighting poner is diminished when the sise

This fighting power is diminished because of

the time it takes to dive being increased.

Siae also involves more compli-

cated mechanism to enable the U-bost to submerge.
to maneuver anc navigate.

It also becomes harder

Therefore, the larger the U-boat, the more

material and control problems become apparent.

The German Navy employed many types of U-boats.

The U-boats with

very small displacements were usually confined to coastal waters. U-boats
of this type would include Types II A, B, C, whioh had ais placements between

381 and 4.60 cubic meters.

12 and 13 knots.

1.
2.
3.

This type's speed above water ranged between

Underwater speed ranged from 6.9 to 7 knots.

3

Many of

Doenits, Ten Years, p. 37.
Ibid .. vTW.
Grb'ner, £., Die Schiffe Per Deutachen Kriegsmarine Und Luftwaffe 1939-45 .
Munchen, 1954, p. 18. Hereafter elted as Groner. Kriegsmarine .
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these, including Type II, C and D, with diaplacementa of 435 and 46O cubic

metera reapeetively ware used fnr oceanic duty aa well aa coaatal operations.

Larger U-boeta were built to engage in oceanic long diatence operatione.
The firat group in thia category waa Type VIIA with a dieplseeaent of 915
cubic metera.^
eight knots.

Tta speed on the aurface was aixteen knots and submerged

Another ocean-going U-boat was Typa 1A, with a displacement

of 1,200 cubic metera.'

C^

2»

More recent tyoes included Type VII 3, C,

ranging from 1,040 to 1,345 cubic meters.

I),

F, and

Their speed on the surface

ranged from sixteen to seventeen knots and submerged from sever, to eight
knots.

All these models were propelled while on the surface by diesel

engines, and while submerged by electrical batteriea.

An invention to helo the U-boat overcome the disadvantage of anrfaclng
to recharge the batteriea waa the aehnorkel.

The schnorkel conaisted of a

hollow tube which would allow 8ir to pass but not water.
waa a steel cylinder, twenty-six feet long.

This hollow tube

Not only would air be permitted

to paaa, but gaaea were exhauated through the tube.

7

The uae of the schnorkel

hampered the location devices of the Allied forces, since the wake caused

by the sohnorkel waa hardly vi8ible to the human eye, and undetectable by
radar.

The Walter boat waa designed to run submerged for long periods of time.

The Walter boat, to be ready for production by 1943, renreaented
type propulalon system.

a

eloaed

A eloaed type txropulaion ayatem needs little outside

aasistance, auch as air to recharge the batteriss, In order to function.

The submarine waa to be propelled by an Ingolin fuel,

4.
5.
6.
7.

Jane's Fighting Ships 19A3-4. p. 220.
Gr finer, Krlc. ^marine, p. 18.
Ibid . p. 18.
Moriaon, Atlantic Battle Won, p. 317.
.

a

conbinotion of diesel

a

IP

oil with H °2*
2

Thu»» TyP* XVII was to us* eteut to run the Walter turbine. 8

This closed propulsion ays tea helped the U-boat achieve a theoretical apeed
of twenty-five knots under water.

Only eight of these U-boata were in the

experimental stage st the end of the war.

It can easily be asserted thst

the aeans of propulsion of the U-boat had improved to the point thet frequent

surfacings to recharge batteries became unnecessary.
Later model U-boets incorporated a variety of propulsion systems.
a

few of these U-boets aver became operational.

Only

The emphasis in thess newer

U-boata, Types XXI, snd XXIII, wss placed on methods of propelling the U-boat.
In June, 1943, Type XXI wss designed.

The battery capacity of this sub-

marine wss three times thst of older U-boats.

Ths hull wss streamlined,

enabling the U-boet to reach an underwater speed of seventeen knots.
hsd s silent motor which worked on soundlessly moving belts.

^

It

The pro pell or

were accurately designed so thst there would be only e slight disturbance
of the water.

Therefore, this design of the propellers cut down on the

sound they gave off.

11

Orders were plsosd for 290 of this type, to be

built by Mereh 1, 1945.
appeared.

In April of 1945, U-2511, the first Type XXI

Of the original 290, 120 were built by the end of the war, with

sixteen to twenty becoming operational.

12

A smaller model of Type XXI

wae to be built with a displacement of 300 cubic met era and an underwater
apeed of seventeen knots.

Two hundred end sixty of these were ordered.

The greatest achievements of these U-boets were their ability to remain
submerged for indefinite periods of time and their underwater speed.

8. Roekill, War at Sea . Ill, p. 17.
9. Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 221.
10. Huge, F., Per Seekrieg . Annepolie, Md., 1957, p. 308.
as Huge, Per Seekrieg.
11. Bekker, Defest st See , p. 211.
12. Morison, Atlsntlo Battle Won , p. 62.

Hereafter cited

The German* had to protect the surfaced U-boat.

In order to counter

Allied location devices, they produced their own receiving devices both
physical and electronic.

The physical invention vss a helicopter, which vaa

used by ths U-boat for observational purposea.

The helicopter was motorlsss,

but had a foot driven mschaniem to keep it in ths sir.

metal and had s light scst.
the U-boat.

It vss mads of light

A cable was attaohed from the helicopter to

This csbls rssohsd a height of 300 meters. 13

This typs of

observation relied upon the human ays and binoculars.

Electronic equipment was developed to ensbls the U-boat to know whan
it hsd been detected on the surfsee by the enemies* radar.

This equipment

would note or receive ths emissions from Allied radar sets.

The first of

these rsosiving devices waa developed in September of 1942.

The purpoae

of this set, Ms tax, was to inform ths U-boat when it had bean hit by s radar

wave.

This sst opersted to receive fifty centimeter

radar waves.

Aftsr heavy lossss and ths reconstruction of s Braumehs tube from a
British bomber, the Germans realised that the Allies were using 10
centimeter radar.

This knowledge led to the building of s rsosiving set

to dstsct ten-centimeter radar.

plsce in August, 1943 •

^

The development of theNexos sst took

By this time the Allies had gone to three-centimeter

redar making the Nexos receiver useless, sines Allied radsr ssts wsrs

using s diffsrent wave length.

The Germans worked on a rsosiving sst for

three centimeter radsr but could not perfect one before the war ended.

The adoption of radar by the German U-boat command waa dslayed until
August 7, 1943.

This delay occurred because of the pre-eminence plseed on

s rsosiving set to counteract the Allies' radar sets.

15

The wave lengths

Science in Submarine Warfare," in Maval Inetituts
Proceedings, Annspolis, 1945, Vol. 71, p. 1258. Hsresfter cited ss Bolts
and Herbert, "Science1 }' NIP . Vol. 71
14. Ruga, Per Seekrleg . p. 97.
15. Bekker, Defeat at Sea, p. 93

13. Bolts and Herbert,

19
of the German sets did not sake use of centimeter radar, although eoae

experimentation vaa carried out along these lines in 1935. 16

Mow German

aubmarinea on the eurface not only had the benefit of radar receiving eeta
but alao radar aeta.

For U-boata operating below the surface, the Germane developed
locating device baaed upon aound tranamiasion.
introduced in April of 1915.

solitary ticke.

a

Thia device vaa the S gear

Thia apparatus would transmit a series of

Each tick would radiate out and be reflected beck when it

Prom this echo-reflection the bearing and range of veseela

hit en object.

on the surfsee could be indicated.

The U-boat* s own course and speed were

The result wss sn outline of the course of attack the

also registered.

enemy or U-boat would take.

17

Therefore, the S gear allowed the U-boat

commander, like Commander Schnee in U-2511, to know what was happening
on the surface.

Thia development came too late in the war to be of use.

The weapon for whloh the U-boat waa designed is the torpedo.

The

development of deadly torpedoea was of essential importance, sines by this
method slone wss the U-boet effective.

merchant and enemy a hi pa.

18

It waa designed for use againat

The acoustic torpedo would be attracted to

the sound of the propellers of the ship.

A modifiestlon of the scouatic

torpedo waa the Wren (T-ll), which was sttracted to the metallic hull of
the ship.

Ths Wren waa of particular use age Inst escort vessels because

of lta attraction to the hull.
1<?

making devices ,

It could not be diverted by any noise-

The Wren wss in production by mid-September, 19A3.

A third torpedo waa the Lut, or Fat torpedo.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

20

This torpedo would sig-ssg

Ibid.,"~pTl02.
Bekker, Defeat at See , p. 93.
Ibid ., p. 204.
Ibjd.., d. 20A.

Thursfiald, H. G., " A levy Chronicle/ in Breesv's Maval Annual 19A1. New Iork,
19AA, P. Ac. Hereafter cited ea Thurefield, " Navy Chronicle," Braaeya.

until it hit ita target, rather than travel in a atreight Una.

Tha Lut

vaa similar to tha Wren, beeauaa it was attracted to the metallic hull of
the ahip.

Theae torpedoea, the Aeouatic, Wren, and Lut

beeaae the chief

,

neana of deatruotlon for the U-bost beneath the aurface.

When the U-boat vaa on the aurface, it depended upon torpedoea and
anti-airoraft gone.

Theae anti-aircraft guns were used for protection

The U-boat on the aurface vaa used as a

againat aircraft.

flak trap.'

An attacking aircraft would be answered by flak from the U-boat.

21

By May,

1913, in reeponee to heavy air attacks, U-bosts were equipped with heavier

anti-aircraft guns, usually 3.7 centimeter guns.

22

The major

(Gerlikona).

weapons of the U-boat remsinou the torpedoea, with anti-aircraft guns used

primarily for defensive purpoaea.
In order to protect the convoys, hunt down, and destroy the U-boats,
the United States had to employ a variety of vessels.

The destroyer

the main fleet weapon, especially the Fletcher class.

The Fletcher ciaea

accounted for a large proportion of the naval building program.

23

w»«j

Other

classes of destroyers included the Ell/son. Benson , Anderson . Geedly .

SBHlS£, Soapare, 3elXrl4ge, and ferrjgut.

The deatroyer escorts, tvo hundred of which had been ordered by 1943,
did yeoman eervice.

Smaller than the deatroyer, about 1300 tons displace-

ment, they could do about twenty knots.

The United Ststss adopted the

Britiah Hunt claaa design and built 1300 of them during the war.

By converting C-3 merchant bulla into aircraft carriers, the United
States Navy paved the way for the CVC building program.

Woolworths.as the

21.
22.
23.

JtugsT^BL^htriftK. P. 198*
Roskill, Wsr st See. Ill I, p. 255.
McMurtiee, F. E„ "Foreign NevieT in grassy' a Naval Anaujl. 19AA.
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24.
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.

British celled them, or auxiliary (baby) carriers , aa the United States
called them, proved of value ea surface eecorta and in hunter-killer groups.

Theae carriers achieved a a peed of 16.5 knots and oould carry from twenty-four
to thirty fighter plsnss.

The United Ststes converted the 3.8. Mormacmall

to the Long Island , for ita first auxiliary carrier. 25 Other olnaaes

included the Sangamon . Kaiser , and Bogus olaas.

Aircraft oame to play a predominant role in the U-boat struggle.

The United Statea utilised land-bee ed and eee-based aircraft, including
blimps.

Land-baaed aircraft were broken into two groups.

end Long Range aircraft.

Very Long Range

Very Long Range aircraft (VLR) included the

modified Liberator and the Coronado (PBT-3).

Long Range planes (LR)

included Liberators, Plying Fortrsssss (B-17's), Catalinas (PBY's),

Marina* (PBM's), Venturas (PV'a), and others.
cluded Grumsn Uildosts

(F^

)

Carrier-based planes in-

and Grumen Avenger torpedo bombers (TBF,

)

However, these planes end vessels needed eld in locating and destroying
the U-boat

The major emphasis of the United Stetes and the Allies was the development of material* to deteot the U-boat above end below the surface .

Many

of the devices and methods used were based on physical properties such aa

sound and light, while others were based on electronic properties.

Although the theories Involving the travel of sound through wstsr were
not perfected, steps were taken eerly by the United Ststes to develop

underwater sound detection.

In the period 1917-1918, the United Ststes

fitted destroyers and sub-chasers with hydrophones, which would dstsot any

25.
26.
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Morlson,
Ibid., p. A3.
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audible noises.

27

At the close of World War I, Langevin.a French

physicist, developed underwater detection, utilising sound waves of high

frequency.

The new method was not simply a listening device, but rather

sound waves were emitted, hit an object, and the returning echo would be
measured.

This method was used by the British who called it Asdic.

The

British converted sound waves from electrical energy by the use of the peizoelectric effects of quarts crystals.

The Americans copied Asdic, but used

magnetostriction instead of the quarts crystal method.
is

"

Magnetostriction

the ability of certain metals to chsnge dimensions under the influence

of magnetism."

28

The methods of sound detection developed at the end of

World War I, enabled the United States to either listen for sounds made by
the vibrations of the U-boat's propeller or to receive and measure the

reflection of

a

sound wave from the hull of the U-boat.

Later improvements in World War II to Asdic by the United States included the improvement in measuring devices, the determination of the effects
of varying conditions on ship noises, the study of sound in other oeeanic
areas, and the study of a ship's background noise.

There was no real

change in principle from the sound devices developed at the end of World

War I.

The United States coined the name sonar to indicate listening,

depth indication, echo ranging, and the location of obstacles.

2Q

Thus, an

improved Jsdic proved useful in locating submerged U-boats by sound detection.

Another device, based on sound detection, was incorporated by the
British in April, 1941.
into the wster from

a

This was the sonobuoy.

merchant ship.

A sonic buoy was dropped

This sonic buoy would pick up the

sounds of a U-boat and transmit a warning by radio.

27.
28.
29.
30.

30

The buoy actually

Baxter, J. P., Scientists Against Time . Boston, 1946, p. 171.
cited as Baxter, Scientists .
Jbid., p. 178.
IMd., p. 176
Ibid ., p. 182
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contained microphones eet et various depths.^ 1

The eonobuoy was used by

aircraft in an attempt to keep track of U-boats,

Aircraft, therefore, had

a sound detection device at their disposal to contact U-boats.

Another physical location device was the Leigh light.
•

svi-

-o

loeata U-boata wha were

nw

Lag ok

fcha

nurfaea at

This light was
tigl

Leigh light would locate, illuminate, and blind the U-boats.

Dae

,

In May,

194.2,

Wellington bombers were equipped with this powerful search light.
Instead of sound and visual detection, electronic detection devices

made use of radio waves and radar.

Radio waves of high frequencies were

used to detect the radio transmissions of the U-boats.
direction finder,

"

Huff Duff/ was used in

into the second war.

32

Wear Id

This type of radio

War I and was carried over

The direction finder would plot the signals sent

by individual U-boats, wolf packs conversing with each other, or U-boats
contacting Admiral Doe nits at headquarters at Lorient, France.

Although

radio detection was not a World War II development, it was pressed into
service for the location of U-boate on the surface.

To locate the U-boat on the surface, raticr was developed.
described as "radio detection and ranging

33

Radar is

Somewhat like sound waves,
<

radio waves can be produced to strike an object and the echo can be measured.
This type of radio wave is only effective above the surface of the water.
The British in 1940 revolutionised radar development by producing
resonant cavity magnetism, which would produce enough power to make redar
feasible at wave lengths less than fifty centimeters.

Prior to this time,

not enough power could be consolidated to produce higher frequencies.

With

this development, the antenna of the set was smaller, making redar feasible for

3l7
32.
33.
34.
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aircraft.

This development meant that a narrow beam vaa produced.

(The

MS

higher the frequency, the shorter and narrower the wave.)

Therefore, the British were the first to develop a narrow beam radar
set of ten oentimeters.

sets.

This set had a greater range, compared to previous

The beam was narrower, making the depree of accuracy higher.

This meant

th8t the angular bearing of the D-boat. am the surface or of an aircraft in
the air, was more accurate.

be distinguished.

"id

Two individual targets olose to one another could

This type of set reflected less clutter from the ground,

from wave9, snd from clouds.

The new ten centimeter sets, making the German

Metox sets useless, were harder to jam because nf the narrower beam.

37

By

June, 194.3, 6,000 sets had been delivered and installed on aircraft,

usually Liberators.
The United States, apecisliaing in airborne radar to detect surfaced
submarines, developed
ten centimeter radar.

a

raaar set to give

a

narrower and sharper beam than

The wavelength was three centimeters, making the

German Nexos receiving set useless.

The first contracts went to S perry and

Weatinghouse to outfit night fighters.

Sperry and Philoo equipped patrol

and torpedo bombers with the same device.'

To supplement sound or radio waves, a device was developed based upon
magnetism.

In October, 1941, the Magnetic Airborne Detector was developed

for the use of aircraft in locating U-boats below the surf see.

Airborne Detector relied upon the effect
magnetic field.

a

The Magnetic

submarine has on the earth's

Actually, the device measures or indicates when it has

passed near a magnetic body.

The first American Catalina Squadron was

fitted with the Magnetic Airborne Detector at the beginning of 1944.

35.
36.
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.

Thus, from either an aircraft or • blimp the submerged U-boat could be

discovered and followed
Aircraft equipped with s Magnetic A irborns Detector were given flares
to help track the U-boat beneath the surfsee.

developed for this purpose.

Specisl floet flares wsre

The flare had to be projected vertically so

that the exact spot could be marked.

Otherwise, the flare would be carried

forward by the motion of the plane, lending shy of the intended position.

Therefore, s plans could follow s U-boat from the markers in the water

indlesting the U-boat •s previous positions.

Work was completed in 1942 on compressed sir projectors to

project

the flare backward at a velocity substantially equal to that of the aircraft."

Therefore, the submerged U-boet could be followed and a trail narked by
flares.

After the submarine was located, means must be devised to destroy the
U-boat.

Weapons developed to accomplish this tssk could be divided into

two cstegories:

The

weapons for surfsee craft and weapons for aircraft.

torpex depth charge, fired from Hedgehogs or Mousetraps, was essentially
s surface oraft weapon.

rockets.

The airplane used the depth charge, but also used

These two weapons, the torpex depth charge and the rocket, helped

eliminate the U-boat.

The torpex depth charge was placed in operation in May, 19A2.

It

had a greater explosive capacity than previous depth charges, being filled

with RDX, TNT, end aluminum.^

1

To achieve a better pattern, in order to

cover a larger area with depth ohargea , the Hedgehog and Mousetrap were

4(h
Al.
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developed in June, 1943.

Both the Hedgehog and Moueetrap
sprayed

of depth ehargea using spigot gun.
and rockets/ 2

a

pattern

The Hedgehog contained

twenty-four charges, while the Mousetrap,
used on smaller surface vessels,
had sixteen. There were two type,
of Hedgehogs, the H.rk 10 art
Mark 11.
Both wore equipped with twenty-four
projectile. d..igneu to .tsy level
when
released. The Mark 10 would disuse
the depth charge, within two and
a half
seconds. The Mark 11 wa. even fa.ter,
about 1.8 second.. Depth charge,
would,
be set to explode upon contact with
an object, by a time setting, or
a depth

setting/"
When the submarine .urfaoed, it became

a

target for che airplane.

aircraft could drop bombs, or use a newer
weapon, the rocket.

were equipped with rockets of two varieties.

which cleared the decks of the U-boat .
constructed of solid lead with

a

U

Aircraft

One was the shrapnel rocket,

The other type of rocket was

shallow projectory to make possible pene-

tration of the U-boat»s hull, while the U-boat was
on the surface.

1%4,

Th.

In

the rocket played an important part in combating
the newly invigorated

U-boat offense.

Avenger torpedo plane, were equipped with these rockets.

Thu., from 1944 the rooket became a valuable weapon
against the surfaced

U-boat/ 5
Besides locating devioes and weapons, other materials were devised
to
aid in the war against the U-boat.

been the normal color.

For the merchant ship, battleship gray had

However, during World War I this type of paint was

found to produce a gray silhouette againat a blaok sky.

Although warship,

in World War I had used a daasle type painting, merchant vessels continued

42.
43.
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,

with gr.y.

Thi. dassle type of printing wa 8 need
by merchant v.,..l, ln

World War II.

Thi. painting resulted in the use of
various color, and

«ig-«ag lines, rather than one aolid color.

Thla dassle painting would

deceive the enemy both aa to course and direction/6

The foxer was another deception device.

It was a noise -making machine

with a speed propeller, which was towed behind
a merchant .hip.

The noise

from the foxer would confuse and decoy the acoustic
torpedo coming from the
German U-boat.

This attraction took plsoe because of the acoustio
torpedoes'

attraction to the noise of the ship's propellers.
foxer were brought forward.

faster than fifteen knots.

One was speed.

Two disadvantages to the

The foxer could not be towed

The aeoond, and far

more important, disadvantage

developed when the noise-making apparatus cancelled out the
merchant ship's
own listening device.

The merohant ship used dassle painting and the

foxer to decoy and deceive the enemy U-boats.

Both sides developed materials to detect one another.
developed weapons to defeat one another.
materials were put to use.

Both sides

Of importance is how the

When were they employed?

How were they

integrated with the tactics and techniques of operations?

46.
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III.

OPERATIONS
"

'Command of the aeaa is the
indispensable basis of security,
bat whether the instrument that
commands swims, floata, or flies,
is a mere matter of detail.'*'

From the German standpoint, the firat six months of war against the
United States proved successful.

These attacks against merchant ships

took place along the American coaat line, in the North Atlantic, in the

Gulf of Mexico, and in the Caribbean.

The Germans concentrated on tankers

whose oil was vital to the Allied war effort.
However, by April, 194.2, a partial coastal convoy system waa incor-

The United Statea utilised

porated, cutting down on the number of targets.

Asdic and the Leigh searchlight.

2

By August, 1942, Allied aircraft detected
Before the end of the year

the U-boat on the aurface, by the use of radar.

the Germans countered with a radar detection device, Metox.

By April,

194.3,

after ten months of anti-submarine warfare, the

Germans had lost the initiative.

The number of U-boats lost was rising.

The Allies had developed anti-submarine rsdar devices, and had overcome
the counter detection devices of the Germans.

New escort carriers and

better air coverage gave the Allies an advantage.

The Allies inaugurated an offensive in the Bay of Biscay attempting
to catch the U-boat8 in transit from their bsaes in Franca.

countered with alternate route8 and air coverage.

The Germans

However, by July, 1943*

the German losses continued, because of 10 centimeter radar.

The Germane

withdraw, biding their time until a new radar receiver, Nexoa, the wren
torpedo, and the schnorkel, became operational.

3

From September, 1943, to January, 1944, the improved U-boata again
entered the battle.

1.
2.
3.

However, the Alliea had also been working on new

Roskill. War at Sea . Ill II, p. 337.
Baxter, Scientists . p. 42.
Ruge, Per Seekrleg . p. 97.

weapons and equipment.

Greater pIv coverage and better location devices

meant the withdrawal of the U-boats.^

The U-boats had to fight a delaying

action until late 1944 end 1945, whBn new types of U-boats would become
operational.

The Germans were forced to fight

a

losing battle.

U-boats were delayed and never appeared in the combat scene.
done so, they would have presented

a

Their

Had they

challenge as great as the U-boat did

at the beginning of the war.

The situation at the beginning of World War II, which confronted the

British and eventually the American navies, because of the destructive power
of the German U-boats, was appalling.

The German U-boat fleet started with

fifty-seven operational U-boats, of which twenty-six could be used for
operations In the Atlantic or other oceans.

About eight or nine U-boats

could be in the Atlantic at any one time, because several were in transit
and others were undergoing repairs or being refitted.

At the time of

America's entry into the war the Germans were building about 20.3 U-boats
a

month.

5

Before entering the conflict, the United States engaged in operations
to insure neutrality.

organized.

On Septmmber 5, 1939, the Air Neutrality Patrol was

In the north Catalinas of Patrol Wing Seven were based at

strategic points such as Argentia, Newfoundland, and Reykjavik, Iceland.
In the south, Patrol Wing Three was stationed at Coco-Solo in the Canal
Zone, while in the middle, Patrol Wing Five was ststioned at Norfolk,

Virginia.

6

The United States, therefore, began protecting and patrolling

its coastal waters in 1939.

Belligerents, other then those countries which had territory in the

Western Hemisphere, were warned by the United States to keep their nsval

4.
5.

6.
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veaaela out.

As of April 18, 1941, the Atlantic Fleet was instructed to

patrol the North Atlantic and the Caribbean Taak Force II vae responeible
for the area northeaat of Greenland. 7

At the Atlentic Conference on August 10, 1941, President Roosevelt and
Prime Minister Churchill deoided that the United States should escort the
Halifax convoys across part of the Atlantic.

Therefore, on September 1,

1941, ehipping between the two United States banes of Argentia and Iceland

was plsesd under United States Naval esoort.

Any Allied hitch-hikers enjoyed

the benefits of United Statea naval protection.

At Argentia, Newfoundland,

the Royal Canadian Navy took over, and at Iceland the Royal Navy assumed

control.

8

Between Newfoundland and Iceland, the United Statea Navy waa

responsible for the protection of the convoy.

Thus, the United States was

engaged in patrolling the sea lanes and protecting the convoys before wsr

On December 12, 1941, the decision was made by Hitler, in conjunction

with hie Admirals, to send twelve U-boats to the ooaat of the United States
to begin Operation Pauchenschlag.

(Roll of Drums)

9

Hitler, beaause of

his suspicions that the British might invade Norway, demanded that a

strong contingent of U-boats be stationed in Norwegian waters.
the originel number of U-boata was out to six.

Therefore,

10

These six U-boats, plus additional arrivals, never going above twelve,
worked from January to May, 1942, off the American coast and in the

Caribbean Sea.

On January 5, 1942, the U-boats ware operating off the

Gulf of St. Lawrence end Cape Ketteras.

By the middle of January, 1942,

seven were operating off Newfoundland, while in March regular explorations

were made off New York Harbor.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Mine-laying duties were carried out off
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Chesapeake Bay and New York Harbor, closing the ports for two and three
daya respectively.

11

The U-boats, besides laying mines, lay submerged

offshore by day, and Bored inshore to attack on the surface at night with
guns or torpedoes.

By April 1, 1942, defensive measures were initiated by the United
States with s partial convoy system, some sir pstrol, and the use of
twenty-four borrowed trawlers and ten corvettes from the Royal Navy.

The

partial convoy system consisted of merchant ships traveling by day and
anchoring at night in protective harbors.

By Hay

H,

1942, adequate pro-

tection was available so that travel from Hampton Roads to Key Meat, Florida,

Guatanamo Bay and New York, Guantanamo Bay to Puerto Rico to Trinidad,
and from Key West to the Western Gulf ports and around the Cape of Good Hope.

Thus, by May, 1942, the United States could adequately provide protection
for ooaatal convoys.

The convoy system was essentially a supply train or the reinforcement
column of the see.

12

The ships of a convoy travel together as s unit with

escort vessels providing a protective acreen.

according to speed.
and 10 knots.

^

Each convoy is grouped

Therefore, convoys axis ted for three speeda, 7.5, 9.5

A convoy usually consisted of forty-five to sixty ships.

The escort commander determined the type of action to be taken.
convoy would either eteam atraight ahead or it would sig-sag.

The

The larger

and slower convoys had by necessity to keep a strsight course using only

mild evssive sotion.

11.
12.
13.
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fifty degrees on either aide of the basic courae.

would lsat from two to six hours.

^

This evasive action

The slower convoy unable to take evaaive

action was a prime target for the U-boat.
In the months of June and July, 1942, the U-boata concentrated in the

Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

U-boata were elao operating in the

Middle Atlantic, taking advantage of the Greenland Air Gap.

U-boata operated

in thia area because air coverage from Greenland had not been achieved.

The U-boats employed the wolfpack method of attack.

The theory behind

the wolfpeck (Rudel) waa to preaent a epread pattern to thi enemy.

Thia

made it difficult to run down all the leads obtained from location devices
Therefore, the U-boat waa used as a ship of the line. 15

When sttsmpting

to locste convoys or gain position, the wolfpack was controlled by Admiral

Doenits from Lorient.

When engaged in en operation, the wolfpack waa

commanded by the 8enlor officer or a control ahip.^ The wolfpack attempted
to run ahead of the convoy, surface, out-maneuver the weak eacorta, and

attack at night.

During thia period the U-boat attempted to eacape detection from Asdic.
The methods utilised by the Germans took advantage of the weaknesses of
Asdic.

The U-boat would vary its depth because of the inability of Asdic

to record whether or not there waa more than one U-boat.

emitted bubbles to give the eame effect.

17

The U-boat also

These ohemicala, which produced

bubbles, reflected strong echoes giving the appearance of several U-boata.

U.
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When an escort vessel attacked a U-boat, the escort vessel' 8 Asdic became
useless, because the vessel's Asdic could not distinguish between the

depth charge and the U-boat.

Thus, the U-boat could take advantage by

varying its depth, or by calculating the depth of the depth chargea and
diving below this depth.

18

The escort vessels countered these U-boat taotlca by using sonar and
creeping tactics.

vessels.

Creeping tactios incorporated the use of two escort

The first escort would track the U-boat and coach the second

escort vessel, which would be attacking the U-boat.

An offensive,

utilising the Leigh searchlight, was also begun against U-boats using
the Bay of Biacsy on the way to and from Prance.

Prom August, 1942, until the end of the year, the U-boats concentrated
along the North American ooast, in the North Atlantic, off Freetown,

South Africa, and off Brssilian and Venesuelan waters.

Vhsn the U-boat

was caught on the surfsee beosuss of radar or the Leigh searchlight, it
chose to fight back with flak guns.

However, before the end of the year

the Metox was in operating, cutting down on the number of surprise

attacks by Allied airorsft.

The United States and Great Britain used 50 centimeter radar in July,
1942, to locate U-boats on the surface.

The use of radar and the Leigh

searchlight helped the Bay of Biscay offensive.

However, at the end

of the year radar sightings were diminishing because of the perfection
of Metox.

Thus, the Bay of Biscay offensive collapsed.

From Jsnuary to April, 1943, the U-boats operated in the North Atlantic,

18.
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Central Atlantic, and off the northern coaat of South America.

By April,

air coverage,
19^3, the Alliea were taking steps toward having complete

better detecting equipment , and newer weapons.
outfitted with extra gee tanks.

Therefore, Liberators stationed in Greenland

could cover the Greenland Air Gap,

Tsn centimeter radar was installed on

aircraft, dsstroying ths value of Metox.

with the Hedgehog and Mousetrap.
commissioned,

In March, Liberators were

Escort vessels were equipped

New auxiliary escort carriers were being

air
Merchsnt ship lossss bsgsn to decline because of better

coverage , the use of radar, and newer weapons

The Germane called May, 1943, "Black May."

20

The Germane loet heavily

aircraft.
The Alliea were using ten centimeter reder in their
losses.
were et first confused as to the reason for their

The Germane

They finally

radar wavelengths.
realised thet Allied aircraft were using diffsrsnt

The

Asoree Air Gap or to an
remaining U-boeta on duty were switched to the

srss southwest of the Asores.

21

In June, the German U-boats wsre better

equipped to meet the Allied attacks.

Anti-aircraft equipment wss increased,

operational.
In September the Wren torpedo would be

Again the battle

linee were redrewn.
December, the battle reged in the
Starting in May and continuing until
line.
the Atlantic to the European coaet
Bay of Biscay from the spproachee of

plene.
of transit by use of the petrol
The Allies attempted to cut the line,
snd
equipped with ten centimeter rsdsr
In thie offensive, Liberator, were
Cstalina flying boat., Patrol 63.
Wellington bombers with Leigh searchlights.
with
Edwin 0 a Wagner, were equipped
under the command of Lieutenant Commander

fflu^ol^^ili^^
194?; p. 166.

of

H-

^
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3

the Magnetic Airborne Detector (MAD).

Destroyers also petrolled the

Bay and ita approaohaa.

The Germane to counter theee attacks and avoid radar detection ueed the
"Piening Route." 23

In July, U-155, commanded by Adolf Planing, proceeded

through Spaniah ooaatal watera.

Radar could not pick up the U-boate beoauee

of the backdrop of the Pyreneee.

Mara hell Goerlng alao assisted Admiral Doenits with Focke-Wulfe 200' e
(boabera) carrying radio controlled glide boabare to uae againat wara hi pa.

German attack boabera (JU-33'a) appeared to attack the patrolling Liberators
and Sunderlands.

Theae air attacks were auooeaaful enough that the Admiralty

orderea all a hipa to retire out of German air range.

The Germans could not understand the reasons for their loaaes of May
to July, 19-43.

Inevitably, gueaaea included the uae of thermal waves or

the radiation of the receiving set, Metoz.

A teat in the Baltio showed

that aircraft could pick up radiations from Mat ox at a height of 6,000 feet

and a range of 110 kilometers.

Action waa taken.

told not to rely on the Metox aat.

U-boat commanders were

However, losses continued and eventually

the Germans put together the Brsumohe tube from a downed British bomber.

They reelised they were up againat ten centimeter radar.

By August, 1943,

the Germane developed a different receiver, Nexoa, to receive the ten

centimeter radiations.

The Wren and better anti-aircraft equipment were

also added at thia time.

In September and October, 1943, twenty-two U-boats were stationed
in twos and threes off Cape Farewell, Greenland.
this group to sea with the message t

'The Fuehrer is watching every

phase of your struggle, attack, fellow up, ainki'"

22.
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With the use of the Magnetic Airborne Detector, eonobaoye, and
rocket-equipped aircraft, the U-boata again Buffered heavy loasea from
26
August to October, 1943 .
Long Range aircraft were now operating fron

Tusaira in the Asores, cutting the distance of the Asores Air Gap.
November 12, 1943, Admiral Doenits and his staff admitted
air menace has curtailed the mobility of the D-boat.
the trump cards.

that.-

On

"'The

The enemy holds all

Far-reaching air cover, using location methods against

which we have no warning."

27

The remaining U-boats were shunted to the

Gilbert Straits.
In January, 1944, the D-boats returned to the Western Approaches of
the Atlantic.

Thirty U-boets were in the Atlantic or the approaches to

the Atlantic

Twenty were located west of Iceland.

Ten were situated

noitheast of the Asores in order to attack the Sierra Leone and Gibraltar
convoys.

Even the Mediterranean waa reinforced.

Of twenty-six U-boats

attempting passage into the Mediterranean, two were destroyed end twelve were
recalled.

The remaining U-boats entered into the Mediterranean.

All

these U-boats were equipped with the schnorkel, anti-aircraft equipment,
and Nexos receiving sets.

In May, 1944, only three merchant ships were sunk out of 3,600 crossing,
in s total of 105 convoys.

The merchant ship losses were small because of

improved and more abundant escort vessels, air-sea escorts, three centimeter
radar, rockets, and the Magnetic Airborne Detector.

By the end of May,

the Germans practically abandoned the North Atlantic, leaving only five

U-boats stationed off West Africa and three en route to the United States

Now

United States aircraft and sea escorts were equipped with three

centimeter radar, the Magnetic Airborne De+ector, rocketa. Hedgehogs, snd

26~.

27.
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Mousetrap*.

The only hop* for th* Germane was to await the tialivery of the

new U-boat*, Type* XXI or XXIII , equipped with the S gear.

became operational with 0-2511 and U-3008 going to sea.
never saw action.
engagements.

"

These newer boat*

A radio message on May 5, 0300 hours halted any

'A* of May 5, 0300 hour*, oeaae fire.

attach* forbidden.

Only two

For U-boats at aes

Break off immediately pursuit of enemy.

Norwegian harbor*, Commander-in-Chief U-boats.'"

Return to

28

In January, 1942, German U-boat commandera could choose their target*.

American defensive measures appeared to be negligible.

Even with the

installation of a partial convoy system, German U-boat success continued
along the American coaat line.

The erea of operations would change,

enabling the U-boats to operete unhampered.

U-boat successes continued in

the North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

However, by

May, 1943, the Allies installed 10 centimeter radar on their aircraft,

making the German Metox set obsolete.

The U-boat* awaited the development

of the Nexe* receiving eet, while the United State* was in the process

of perfecting 3 centimeter radar.

In August, 1943, the U-boat again

entered the Atlantic, equipped with the schnorkel end wren torpedoes.

The Allies equipped planes with the Magnetic Airborne Detector, three
centimeter radar, and the rocket.

28.
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The Germans never regained the offensive.
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IV.

THE SUBMARINE WAR AS THE PUBLIC SAW IT.

"Truth oruihto to earth, shall rive •gain,
Th' eternal rear* of God are hera
Out error, wounded, wither in pain
And dlea aaonf? hia worafalpera 1

Tha war that was fought at aaa vaa ra-fought in nava papers in the United
Statee.

These newspapers bad to rely on government information as the major

source of supply for news on the U-boat war.

Therefore, both the United States

Government and the British G over resent attempted to give the public eeleeted
information on the U-boat theater of opcretions.

It was important to the

Government that the American and British peoples know the effect iveneea of
the anti-submarine campaign and the progress that was being made.

It wsa

neoeeaary for the United States Government to release newa in order to combat
the fears of the people that the U-boat war wea not progressing very well,

especially with toe news of merchant ship sinkings, such es the sinking
of the C ombre reported on January 17, 1942.
:ieodeu in oruer to combat German

2

Newapsper reporta were elao

propepemo, such ea the German claims of

oiriin./ 924,000 tons in the month of May, 1943.'

Therefore, the question

can be raises as to the official policy of the United Statee end Great Britain
towera news on the U-boat war and how this policy actually materiellsod.

The Americen policy, concerning information on the U-boat threat end antisubmarine actions, vaa divlued into two phases .

from the beginning of the war to March 13, 1943.
was to give no Information at all.

Phase One wee the perioa
The policy in this period

This no-information policy included

engagements with the enemy, euceeeaee against the enemy, end the eucoeeaee of

1.
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the enemy.

The attitude of the Navy was "Let ue cheer the disappearance

(of U-boats) and be contented to wait the explanation of the
mystery."^

Therefore, an appeal was made by the Navy; "Every American can
regard silence
and secrecy as his own personal anti-submarine weapons." 5

Naval policy

was not stagnant and was changed on March 18, 1943, by the United
States

Navy Department.

The United States would now make known when submarine

encounters had taken place, and what the results were.

The news released

by the United States was usually a month to three months behind the actual

occurrences.

These policies had an effect on how the submarine war was

reported.

The anti-submarine war was broken down into varying categories such as
areas of action, localities of specific actions, enemy losses, and Allied
losses.

With regard to the areas of action, an identification of areas

where U-boats were operating, the policy permitted no information in Phase One.

When specific actions took place, the Navy would not describe the action.
President Roosevelt on January 21, 1942, defended this policy when he stated?

"To disclose definite action against the submarines would be unwise."**
In Phase Two the information ban was eased considerably, although dates and

specific location were rarely given.

In Phase Two, American successes were

reported more frequently.

Merchant and naval sinkings by U-boats were not released in Phase One
until several months after the engagement.

Further, on November 15, 1942,

the Navy forbade the disclosure of the names of sunken ships, whether naval

4.

5.

"Navy Strikes 'Strong Blows' as U-Boats Continue Attack," The New York
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6.

units or merchantmen.

In Phasa Two this policy was continued.

This

can be seen from the questions raised by The New York Times regarding

merchant sinkings.

"Why," it was asked, "conceal the fact of merchant
a

sinkings.

Hitler brought the war to our doorsteps."

The overall polioy of the British government toward U-boat coverage
was to release the news at the best possible time.

From the beginning

of the war until March, 1943, the British followed a no-news policy with

slight moderations.

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander,

would release information at times regarding the success of British
methods.

In Parliament on October 21, 1942, this release was sttaoked

by Mr. Clement Dnvies.
this attack.

"

The London Times naval correspondent described

It constituted a change of polioy and that if such state-

ments should be published at all, they should be made in the House of
Q

Commons rather then elsewhere."

Therefore, Phase One could be seen as

an attempt to keep pertinent information at a low level, but the

Admiralty was willing to release information at times.
On March 18, 1943, the curb wss lifted, allowing articles giving

information on battles occurring within s week of the reported event.
"

It hss not hithsrto been the practice of the Admiralty to make publio

any details of operations versus U-boats until a period of some weeks
after they had taken pleoe."

10

The veil was lifted.

This lifting of

restrictions could be considered the second phase of public releases
by the Admiralty.

7.
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The Admiralty attempted to formulete these polioiea to handle four
different categories of information.

In Phase One and Two the policy

concerning the general locality of U-boat operations was not stringent.

When reports were given, little Information was given on the specific
locality of the engagement.
a

Enemy losses in Phase One were not as guarded

secret as in the United States.

For example, on January 28, 1942, in

The London Times, U-433 was reported sunk by the Corvette H.M.S. Marigold.
In Phase Two, the Admiralty was willing to relesse figures on the suoeess
of the anti-submarine war more readily.

The Admiralty did not release

much information on merchant shipping losses.

In Phase One merchant

shipping losses were mentioned from time to time.

In Phase Two, the

British in coordination with the United States would make a statement on
merchant losses.

To coordinate statements on merchant losses and U-boat sinkings,
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill began issuing reports
on the U-boat war.
October, 1943.

These statements were stsrted during Phase Two, in

They dealt more with the ratio of merchant ships sunk to

the number of submarines sunk, than to exact figures on merchant vessels
or U-boats sunk.

For example, on December 10, 1943, it was announced

that more U-boats than Allied ships were sent to the bottom in November.

Similarly on May 10, 1944, the Joint report said that United Nations'
activity versus the U-boat was continuing at a highly satisfactory level.

U

Thus, in Phase two, the United States and Great Britain attempted to

coordinate their reports.

11.
12.

"U-Bost»s Brief Life," The London Times . 49, 263, (Jan. 28, 1942) p. 9.
"U-Boats Held in Check/ The New York Times . XCIII, 31, 518,
(May 10, 1944), p. 4.

In the United States, the implementation of thla policy
eould be
ae,n

Th« New York T|mcs.

la the first phaae, general atatementa were

predominant on the success of anti-eukaarina aesauree.

It was reported

that a one recent visitors would never enjoy the return trip. 13

other

releaaea would hint that an una pacified number of submarinea were
liquidated off the Atlantis Coaat.

Other reporta hinted that the percentage

of one-way traffic was increaaing.

On January 25, 1942, the article,

"

Nary Hinta Again at the Sinking of U-boata,"

^

appeared, In which it

was reported that countermeaeuree against U-boata were continuing
favorably.

Exact figures on U-boat alnkinge were seldom given.

the few times was in April, 1942.

One of

The number of U-boata aunk by

United States Forcea was given as twenty-eight. 15

These at at amenta re-

flected the press reports from January, 1942, to May, 1942 of Phase One.

From May, 1942, to the end of Phase One, enough information was
given to the press to indicate that German U-boats were being sunk.

On

February 23, 1943, it was reported that a destroyer of unstated nationality
had sunk a U-boat a few miles south of Pioo Island in the Asores.
reports indicated that the US8 Campbell

Other

rammed a Nasi submersible, 1000

-i

miles out on the Atlantic.

Thus, during the letter part of Phase One

more reports were given of German U-boat loaaea.

During Phase One, reports on merchant losses were given either in
official naval department statements or by unofficial Associated Press counts.

"Victories," N££, XCI, 30,681, (Jan. 24, 1942), p. 1.
Navy Again Hinta Sinking of U-Boeta," The Hew York Timea. XCI,
30, 682, (Jan. 25, 1942), p. 7.
15. "U. S. Pilots Get 3 U-Boata," The New fork Times. XCI, 30, 749,
(April 2, 1942), p. 1.
16. "Convoys Rout U-Boat Packs/ The Hew York Times . XCI, 30, 687,
(March 18, 1942) s p. 1.
13.
14.
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the few times was in April, 1942.
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Thsss statements re-

flected the press reporta from January, 1942, to Msy, 1942 of Phase One.
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On

given to the press to Indicate that Gsrasn U-boats were being sunk.

February 23, 1943, it wss rsportsd tbst s destroyer of unstated nationality
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reports indicated that ths USg Caapbsll

Biles out on ths At Untie.

16

Other
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"Victories,* JSE, »I, 30,681, (Jen. 24, 1942), p. 1.
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30, 682, (Jan. 25, 1942), p. 7.
*U. S. Pilots Get 3 U-Bosts," Ths EfW Xgrk limps, *CI » 30. 749,

16.

-Convoys Rout U-Boat Packs/

13.
14.

1

(April 2, 1942), p. 1.
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For example, on March 31, 1942, the Associated Frees reported

total of

one hundred merchant sinkings, sines the beginning of hostilities.

official count at this tiae was twenty-two merchantman sunk. 17

The

A Bevy

spokesman on January 20, 1943, out the total merchantmen sunk at 685
since the begi nning of the

18
war,,

Therefore, it can be aeen that reports

were presented in The Hew York Times on the ststs of U-boat and merchant-

ship loaaes in Phase One, even though a period of no information was in
effect

After the accelerated successes of the Allies in 1943, more information became available.

The news releases included more information on

the individual battles in the Atlantic end other operational areas.

reports were rarely up-to-date or detailed.

These

For example, on April 24, 1943,

a German U-boat was reported destroyed in the Caribbean by a petrol bomber,
»

several months ago/

19

The policy of Phase Two wee carried out in the reports on the number
of U-boats sunk.

On September 8, 1943 3 the United States reported that

in three months ; May, June, and July, twenty-nine U-boats were sunk.

Twenty-four of these twenty-nine were credited to naval units.

Mr. Angus

MscDonald, Minister of National Defease for Great Britain, on March 10,
1944* gave a more precise picture of Allied success in 1943.

He described

the foe's losses In 1943 aa heavy, with more than 200 German, Italian,

and Japanese submarines sunk.

20

According to these sample reports, more

news on individual sinkings and the total number of U-boats sunk, was being

given.

Ffff Xfflfr TaHTffi XCI » 3°» 7*7 *
(March 31, 1942), p. 7.
18.
66 Believed Lost with British Ship/ Tht Tflf YrCfci TlTOfi XCII, 31,042,
(Jan. 20, 1943), p. 6.
19. • German Submarine Sunk In Caribbean," »hf *T¥ Xffflft Tfifltf r XCII, 31, 166,
(May 24, 1943), P. 3.
> 31, 457,
20. -roe's Losses Called Heavy/ Tht fffflf IlDt TiWt.
(Sept. 8, 1943,), p. 13.

17.

"U-Boat Men Knew Ships* Cargo," Tht

™u

u
In Phaae Two, xnerohant shipping losses were given in accord with
the agreement on Joint statements by Roosevelt and Churchill.
statements would appear such ae

Allied Ship Losses at Record Low." 21

Other statements hinted that the U-boat was becoming

than the hunter."

22

Therefore,

"

the bunted rather

Thus, the policy of c cabined reports on the U-boat

war appeared during Phase Two.
The carrying out of British policy with regard to Fhaae One and Two
could be seen by examining The London Times .

The policy of giving soaas

information could be seen in Phase One of the U-boat war.

Mr. A. V. Alex-

ander, on October 21, 19-42, described $30 U-boata as either damaged or

sunk by Allied foroes.
before June of 1940.

These figures did not include French successes

Some American

Mile had been

set of figures was given in February, 1942.

U-boats had been sunk so far in the war.

2^"

included.

23

Another

This report stated that 130

Two often contradicting

reports by the British and Americans en Allied successes were released

In Phase One, merchant shipping losses were not as publicised as

in American newspapers.

Reported merchant shipping losses in Phase One

gave very little information.

"Four merchant ships sunk/

26

On September 15, 1942, it was reported!

and

Hated the Ottawa and Raccoon

as sunk.

On February 12, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill indicated that in the

first year of the war, every U-boat lived long enough to kill nineteen

21.

22.
23.
24.

25.

"Allied Ship Losses at Record Low," The New York Times . XCIII, 31, 457,
(March 10, 1944), p. 1.
500 U-Boats Sank in War," The Hew lork Times . XCIII, 31, 610,
(August 10, 1944), p. 1.
"The War at Sea," The London Times . 49, 372, (Oct. 21, 1942), p. 2.
" 130 U~Boats Sunk," The New York Times . XCI, 30, 709, (Feb. 20, 1942),
p. 3.
"Four Merchant Ships Sunk," The London Times. 49, 341, (Sept. 15, 1942),
p. 3.

45

merchant ships.

In the second year, U-boats accounted for twelvs ships

a piece, while the average dropped to seven and a half ships for the

third year.

26

Thus, in Phase One the British allowed more information

on merohantshlp losses to be published.

Aftsr the veil was lifted,

dsta on the losses of U-boats.
reported sooner.

Lnndnq TMpyt

Th*>

Individual engagements and sinkings were

For example, North Atlantic aircraft of the Coastal

Command destroyed five U-boats in ten days.

within

a

published sore specific

week of the engagement.

bombing raids on enemy posts.

'

These successes were reported

Similar reports were announced concerning

Thus, it was announced on April 1, 1945,

that the United States Eighth Army Air Tores with 650 Liberators and

Plying Fortresses had killed seven U-boats at Bremen and one at Hamburg.

28

During Phase Two, the number of U-boats sunk during the war or for
certain periods of the war, was released more often.

Vice Marshal A. B.

Elwood, RAFC Coastal Command, stated on September 3, 1943, that between

May and August, 1942, thirty U-boats a month had been killed.

29

A

statement was Issued on June 30, 1943, by Mr* Malcolm Macj&cnald, British

High Commissioner In Canada.
sunk came to one a day.

He stated that the total number of U-boats

It can be seen that reports on the progress of

Allied successes against the U-boat followed the policy statements on

Phase Two.

The motivation behind the United States adopting

a

no-information

26.

"Mr. Churchill on Casablanca Decisions," The London Times .

27.
28.

"5 U-Boate in 10 Days," The London Times , 49, 559, (May 31, 1943). p. 4
"Eight U-Boats Sunk by Bombers, The London Times . 50, 105,

29.

"

49, 468, (Feb. 12, 1943), p. 5.
1

'

(April 1, 1945), p. 1.
90 U-Boats in May, June, and July," The London Times . 49, 645*
(Sept. 8, 1943), p. 3.

policy for Phase One was twofold.

One reason

in order to desl a blow to Nasi morale.

vm

to maintain alienee

Thia reason vaa baaed upon tb«

ballef that tba enemy not knowing about the fate
of non-returning 0-boats,

would grow fearful.

Therefore thia apprehension of not returning
would

make the U-boat eerviss Increasingly unpopular.
a military one.

The aeeond reason

vn

President Roosevelt in January, 1942, most aptly

deseribed the military viewpoint.

"It would invite everyone to inspect

map showing the location of United States Naval vessels."

30

a

Thus, the

American policy decision was motivated by a military and a
psychological
concern.

With the success of the U-boats and the building by Germany of
twenty or thirty submarines a month, this strict censorship of
leases

was questioned.

The Navy on Mareh 4, 1942, recognising the fact that

the American public was getting a picture of merchant losses without

any U-boat sinkings, considered issuing the news of victories faster. 31

This policy of no information because of military and psychological
concerna by no mean* escaped without criticism or discontent.

The

discontent centered around the lop-sided attacks by U-boats on merchant
shlpa.

Should these attacks go unreported?

At Trenton, New Jersey, on

February 9, 1942, 125 delegates to the New Jersey Press Convention
criticised the Navy for its "no news" policy. 32

The reasons for the shift in emphasis in Phase Two was the use of
the wolfpack by the Germans.

By the use of many U-boata in operation

30.
31.

"Navy Strikea 'Strong Blows'", BE, XCI, 30, 6?8, (Jan. 21, 1942), p. 5.
News of Victories May Be Sped by Navy," The New York Tirnep . XCI,

32.

"Navy Report Criticised," The New York Times , XCI, 30, 698,

30, 720,

(March A, 1942), p. 3.

(Feb. 10, 1942), p. 13.

47
against a convoy, the loaa of on* U-boat would be known to the other

embers of the wolfpeck.
France,

This information would be relayed to Lorient,

Therefore, the waiting for an overdue U-boat would be cancelled.

Other reasons would include partial Allied suooese and the British policy
on war information.

In

The,

New fork Times on March 19, 1943, it was

reported that the Britiah had a decided effect on the American change in
policy.

33

The motivation for the policy formulated in Phaae Two waa to give
the public information which stressed Allied sucoeases.

This could be the

reason why the ruling forbidding the releaae of the namea of sunken
merchant vessels or naval

mita

secrecy waa criticised by

c

waa kept, during this period.

This

olumnlat Edwin L. James, who charged that

this policy left the public puisled.

He insinuated tbst public opinion

became confused when the Truman report of March, 1943, atated that

merchant ship losses totalled 1,000,000 tons a month.

Secretary Knox

disputed these figures in March, 1943, stating that this figure referred
to the total loss in gross tons for the year 1942.

Edwin L. James also

pointed out that the confusion as to merehantahip loaaea waa further
3
aided by Nasi propaganda. *

Thus, if the merchant losses were not pub-

lished, the publio would remain confuaed and Nasi propaganda would have
a better opportunity to take hold.

By relying on the publication of

American success, the Navy waa attempting to play down merohant loaaes.

The Britiah reasoning on their policy in Phaae One followed the
American reasoning cloaely.

However, one of the major reasons for

(March 19,
33. ~"U-Bost Curb Eased/ Ths New York Times . XCII, 31, 100,
1942), p. 13.
Pussled,"
34. James, E. L., " Seoreay on Ship Losses Leaves Public
The New York Times . XCII, 31, 107, (March 25, 1943), Sec. IV E, p. 37.

48

British alienee

vn

a Military on«.

Thia nathod vaa Intended to delay a

new U-boat from replacing tha loat ones. 3 *

In othar words, by ramalnlng

eilent, it would take tha Germane longer to discover that a U-boat had

been loat, and to replace it with another ona.

Thia essentially vaa

tha motivation behind tha British policy in Phase Ona.

Tha British changed tha empheaia of their policy for the same reasons
as the Americans .

The British found there wea a need to keep up public

Interest and encouragement .

Thus, because of the need for encouragement,

and the German use of the wolf peek, tha policy was changed*

British motivation in the second phase waa aptly summed up by Mr.
Erendsn Braoken, the First Lord of the Admiralty.

The principle should

be the? speediest possible release of all communiquea dealing with operational n ewr* with an even balance between press and radio.

Behind theaa

statements is the fact that the Britiah wished to concentrate on the German
losses.

The Allied merchant losses were primarily given in the RooseveltChurchill announcements.

These reports were initiated to help coordinate

the American-British news releaaea.

Therefore, discrepancies and contra-

dictions were out down.

The results of these policies sen be seen in the picture that waa
presented to the public in Phase One, Phsse Two, at the end of the war
and In postwar estimates.

In Phase One the public waa presented with

reports on the operetions of U-boata along the American coaat.

35.
36.

For

"Victories," EE, *CI, 30, 681, (Jsn. 24, 1942), p. 2.
"Release of News," The London Times . 49, 845, (March 30, 1944), p. 2.
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example, on April 13, 1942. Hanaon
Baldwin reported

-

U-boat, off our Coaat/ focuaaing
on Hattera.. 37 In

„ portB

Eight to tvelre
on

-ngage«nt., indication, were given
that U-boat, vera being
aunk.

On

February 26, l*AJ, it waa reported
that three U-boate were aunk
and
four more damaged in the Weatern
38
Atlantic.
However, merchant .hip
lo..e. accounted for a bulk of the
reporting.

On

larch 31, 19*2, the

Awociated Pre., reported one hundred merchant
.hip. aunk, .inc. the
•tart of the war.

It va. true that .tatementa
were made concerning

the action, againat the U-boat, but
the predominant image la the operation
of U-boat, along the Coast and the
auoceaa of theae U-boat, in .inking

merchantmen.

Pha.e Two brought the fulcrum to the
opposite side.

The public

wa. made aware of the U-boat losses, but
little was .aid on merchant
loa.ee.

Individual engageaenta and total .inking report,
gave the appear-

ance of Allied auoaeaaea againat the U-boat.

Merchant losses were

confined to the coordinated report, of Roosevelt
and Churchill.

Theae

report, alao indicated the U-boat loeaea.
At the end of the war, the public was preaented with
a number of

reports on the success of American anti-eubmarine methods
against the
U-boat.

In All Hand. , in June 1945, Admiral Jonaa H. Ingram, Commander-

in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, reported that the United States Navy had

definitely sunk 126 U-boate and probably more.39 Admiral Bellinger, Commander
of the Atlantic Fleet Air Arm atated that Si of the 126 U-boata were

aunk from the air.

37.

38.

39.

On June 11, 1945, The New York Time, atated that

Baldwin, H. V., "Air Power In the War, III/ Th« flam r™* T>«,
»%, 30, 760 (April 13, 1942), p. 4.
" 56 Enemy Shipa Sunk By Cur Navy/ The New York
Tiae? f XCI, 30, 714,
(Feb. 26, 1942), p. It
Ingram, J. H., 'All Hands," in the Naval Inatltute
Anaapolia, 1945, Vol. 71, p. 856.

Proa—
din™ ,
rev^nga
.
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U-boat losses were

a at at

713 with 151 being credited to United States

forces/ 0 The Hew York Herald Tribune gave 151 to the United States and
Allied forces under American control.

with

The British Empire was credited

while 100 were destroyed by other causes.

4.62,

These figures do

not include U-505, which was captured by American forces on April
6, 1944

At the end of the war the generally accepted reeult was 151 U-boats for
the United States forces.

This result appeared in The

Kw

York Tlm»m nnri

New York Herald Tribune .
The extent of German submarine losses hss been debated for years after
the war.

This debate hss led to a number of different estimates of the

German losses.

Admiral King in his report, United States Navy at Way , in

1946, states that nine U-boats were sunk in 1939, twenty-two in 1940,

thirty-five in 1941, eighty-five in 1942, one hundred thirty seven in
1943, two hundred and forty one in 1944, and one hundred and fifty three

42
in 1945.

The total is 682 U-boats.

of the United States

Naw

.

Dudley Knox, author of A Hist ory

in 1948 oredits the British with 561 U-boats.

The United States Is credited with 177 U-boats.

Another sixteen U-boats

were credited to both the United States and Greet Britain, because of
joint action.

To these 177 U-boats another 62 could be added, because

of United States

Amy

Air Force bombing raids In the interior of Germany.

Another fourteen U-boats were attributed to French, Dutch, Norwegian, and

Csech units J**

No mention was made of the accomplishments of the Royal

Canadian Navy.

407~" U-Boat Losses Set at 713," The Hew York Tlmea. XCIV, 31, 915, (June
11, 1945), p. 3.

41.

"713 U-Boats Sunk," in the N*y«l ins titute Proceedings . Annapolis,

42.
43.

1945, Vol. 71, p. 871.
Kine, USN at War , p. 206.
Knox, Hla torv of the United States

Hwy

.

New York, 1948, p. 529.
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Prime Minister Churchill attributed to the Allies credit for sinking

780 U-boets out of 781 German and 85 Italian submarines .
accounted for 524.

Tae British

The United States was credited with 174.

Eighty-two

U-bosts were sunk because of other nationalities or unknown causes.^
In 1946, the United States published the

Yellow Book/ entitled

German f Japanese, and Italian Submarine Losses in World War II.
publication gave the loss of German U-boats as 781 vessels.

This

This evalua-

tion was made by the Chief of Naval Operations Ccaemittee on Damage to

Enemy Submarines, and Its British counterpart, The British Admiralty
Assessment Commission.

When this figure, 781, is broken down, the British

were given e finsl total of 411 U-boats destroyed.

The United States Armed

Forces received a totsl of 166, while the Canadians and Austrslisns
z.6

The claims of

aocounted for forty and twelve U-bosts respectively.
the four Allies totaled 629 German submarines.

In 1955, the Naval Historical Division published

Chronology. World War II .

United States Naval

This work listed the contributions of the

United States to the anti-aubaarine war.
170 U-boats.

a

This contribution amounted to

This figure was broken down into actions in various sones

of operations, like the Caribbean, South America, United States Coast,

English Coast, Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean.
American forces aocounted for twenty U-boats.

In the Caribbean,

Off the United States

Coset and off the English Coast the count was six and eight U-boats
respectively.

44.
45.
46.

In the Mediterranean, American foroea accounted for eight

Churchill, W. S., My Finest Hour. Boston, 1949, p. 6.
Moris on, The B attle of the Atlantic, p. Appendix 1.
Vftl11 - Annapolis, Md.,
German. Japenesa. and jjjgai fr'W 1 "* Loammm
1946, p. 1.
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U-boata.

In the Atlantic, the largest and
busiest operational zone,

the count rose to seventy-four U-boats.

Another forty-two were destroyed

by bombing raids by United States Army
Air Forces/7

Thus, the total

of U-boats destroyed amounted to 170.

Although the true picture could not be given
until after the war,
controversy as to the proper figure on U-boat
losses still continues.
This figure has fluctuated between 126 U-boats
and 174.
the public was not told the number of U-boats
sunk.

During the war,

Now, after the war

the public cannot help being confuaed by the
range of figures brought

before it.

What was the real accomplishment of the United
States forces

against the U-boat?

IP.

And why do the discrepancies trested above exist?

Naval Air Bombingi have been included under the 170 U-boats.

V.

THE NUMBER OP D-BQATS ACTUALLY SUNK
"

'We, an Island Power, ., ..dependent on the
sea, can read the lessen and understand
our own fate had we failed to master the
U-bo«ts.»" 1
- Winston S. Churchill

The difficulty in accurately determining the number of U-boats
sunk by United States Forces is suggested from the Tarying figures
published in American successes.

This difficulty arises out of the

problem of when s U-boat was sunk and by whom.
for these varying figures.

There are four reasons

The first involves the inaccuracy of reports

by esoort vessels and aircraft of the United States.

The second occurs

because some operations against U-boats wears carried out by escort craft
of two different nationalities.

Who should receive credit for the kill?

Per example, when British A ir Squadron 224 teamed with the United States

Army A/S 4 Squadron to sink U-4G4 on July 28, 1943, the credit for the
sinking was given to both nationalities.

2

The third reason is the

placing of foross of one nationality under control of another nationality.
It was decided at the Atlantic Convoy Conference on March 1, 1943, that

the United States would place an escort carrier and five destroyers

under British control for convoy duty in the North Atlantic.

3

When

this group sunk s U-boat, did the United States or Great Britain receive
tivi

er-,.:-':'-"

The feur-Ui problem eris«fs from the joint

frsslslSf,

attacks

on German posts by the United States Army Air Forces and the Royal Air

1.
2.

Roakill. War At Sea . Ill, p. 37.
United Statea Naval Chronology World War II . Waahington, 1954, p. 57.

3.

Roakill, War At Sea . II, p. 211

Forcea .

Whoae bombs accounted for the destroyed U-boats?

Therefore,

the aifficulty in eolvlng theee problem, with the eddou problem of

complete error* ( leada to the Tarying figures oa U-boat leases J*

Here the German aata on looses suffarect Is of greet aaaiatanee in
minimising error.

Of 1,111 U-boats commissioned during the war, the

German Navy lost 817 U-boate.

Admiral Doe nit* s peculates that out of

these 817, 753 were destroyed, vails others were damaged or surrendered,,

The German breakdown includes 603 lost by naval action.

Sixty-two were

lost because of unknown causes, while seven were lost through accidents/

Besides the 603 lost U-boats, eighty-one U-boats were sunk by Allied
bombing attacks in port or by mines.

However, s statistical breakdown

on sinkings by the different nationalities is lacking.
Erio Groner in 195A, attempts to give a more deteiled record of
the German losses, by consulting the German records.

destroysd by United States forces.

101 U-boata were

m

fr ftt*f^~l6**mim-*am

He indicates that
His work,

*»f*&*m MW-ian.

did not

always distinguish the nationality of the attacking vessel or aircraft.

This is particularly true of aircraft.

Therefore, the description ss to

how s particular U-boat waa sunk, often leaves the identity of the
attacking aircraft or veasel unrepealed.

0-682 reads

"

31. 3. L5

Par example, the listing of

Hamburg / Fli-Bo,"

1945, U-682 was sunk by s plane at Hamburg.

data Is known is

•

0-629 8.6.

U*

7 meaning that on March 31,
An example of where all

Kanal V. Brsst / Brit. Fli-Bo."

8

of Brest
This notation indicates that U-629 wss sunk in the Channel west

by British aircraft on June 8, 19U.

5.

6.
7.
8.

Haam f Per Seekries. p. 37
Doenits, Ten Years . Appendix 6.
Gr&ner, Die Sehiffe, p. 55
Ibid., p. 54.

Therefore, it can be seen that the

•

the number 101 is almost certainly not complete and that
only the

comparison of all svsilsble data will provide a reasonably accurate
result

In order to sol»e the problems cf sinkings involvine different
nstionalities, of combined bombing attacks , end units under British
control, certain rules oust be established.

All U-boats sank, by units

consisting of more than one nationality, will be credited to the combined netlonalitiea.

Neither nationality will reoeive individual credit.

Both the United States and Great Britain would therefore reoeive credit
for 17-404.

This decision rests on the premise that it is Impossible

to distinguish who actually sunk the U-boat.

Similarly, when U-boats

are sunk during a combined strategic bombing attack by the United States

Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force, credit will be given both, with
no individual credit.

When United States vessels and aircraft were

operating under British control, the oredit for any U-boat sinkings

would go to the British and vice versa.
In order to achieve aoeuracy and to substantiate the number of U-boats
sunk by Unitsd States Forces, four sources were consulted.

publications, United States Naval Chronology

W

g,

United States

and German. Japaneae.

and Italian Submarine Losses in WW II . gave the American aide.

On the

German side, Pit Sphjf ft Per Deuteohea Erlefiamarlne Und Luftwaffe 1939-194?
provides valuable information.
is' used as s

The War at Sea , by Captain S. W. Roskill,

confirmation report.

To help define the area in which the

last operations of the U-boat were taking place, the U-boat's previous

actions are also helpful.

Therefore, with the various presumptions and

the attempt to cross cheek, an accurate representation of the success of

56

American operations against the U-boat can be obtained.
In tha final analysis, the figure decided upon to represent
the

contribution of the United States Armed Forcea in the anti-submarine

war was narrowed down to

U8

oonfiraed U-boata.

Twenty U-boats were

credited to United States Forcea acting in cooperation with another
country.

Of these twenty U-boata, eleven were killed in operation* at

see, while nine sinkings occur r«id during boabing raids.

To sake it easier to organise and to atudy where theee
were sunk, various areas will be marked out.

U3

G-boata

These area boundaries are

necessary to facilitate the handling of the material ana aleo to provide
an examination of the success of United States Forces in these various
areas.

These areaa include the Atlantic and its surrounding entities, such

as the Caribbean, North Sea, and Mediterranean Sea.

Specifically,

these

sonea include the American Coast Line, Middle America, the South American
Coast, Atlantic Group A, Atlantic Group B, the European Coast, and the

Mediterranean Sea.

Two German U-boats that were sunk outside of the

areas of inspection have not been included in the total. These oraft,

0-537 and U-183, were sunk in the Java Sea. 9

All the remaining U-boats

discussed will be found in the operational sonea specified.

The first sons is that of the American Coast Line.

The boundary

runs from Northern Newfoundland to approximately Northern New Jersey.

Specifically, the boundary of this son* is found from 50°N
C

A0 K 50°W.

9.
10.

10

1

-jO

*'

to

The question is raised as to the number of U~bcats aunk in

Ibid ., pp. AB and 53.
See Chsr< #1.

.
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The actual number of confirmed sinkings within this sone ie rather
small considering the number of merchant ships engaged there by the enemy

early in the war.

The total comes to six U-boats.

Four of these six

were sunk by escort vessels and two by attacks from the air.
one U-boat, U-174, was sunk.

In 1943, only

This occurred on April 27, by Aircraft VB-125.

Not until 1944 was another U-boat sunk in this sone of operations.

Two

U-boats were then accounted for, 0-233, by the USS Baker and USS Thomas .
and U-1229, by Aircraft VC-42.

surface craft.

In 1945 three U-boats were sunk, all by

U-866 was aoeountcd for by the USS Lowe . USS Monger .

USS Pride , and USS Reuben Jones .
the USS Mobarlv killed U-853.

1L

On May 6, 1945, the USS Atherton and

It oan

readily be seen that the American

coast line was not a major battle ground.

In fact, the greatest successes

occurred when the U-boat battle was waning, in 1945.

The Middle American sone included the lower part of the United States
coast and the Caribbean.

The Middle American sone extended along the coast

from Northern New Jersey to Florida, encompassing the Caribbean Sea and
the Gulf of Mexico.

The specific boundary consists of 40°N by

10°N 60°W and extends as far vest as the Gulf of Mexico.

12

60°tf

by

Unlike the

American coastal sone, the Middle American sone had a higher number of
sinkings

Fifteen U-boats were destroyed in this sone.

Eight U-boats were

destroyed by aircraft, either land-baaed or oarrier-based.

Five of the

vanquished U-boats were sunk by sea vessels, while two were destroyed by
a combined attack by air and sea forces.

sunk.

11.
12.

In 1942, nine submarines were

July was the largest month with three submarines destroyed.

See Appendix 3
See Chart #2

One, U701,

55

o

W

w
a

was deetroyed by alp, while the other two ware destroyed by an air/sea
combination.

These two U-boats were U-153 and U-576.

U-boata were never to return hone.
three U-boats killed.

U-159, and U-359.

In 1943, fire

July was the moat eventful month with

VF-32, a Naral Eand-fi nsed airoraft aank U-759,

In 1944, the only accountable aoticn was the sinking

of U-550 by US? Grandy, U3S Joice . and U58 Peterson . 13 The major battle

here waa fought in 1942 and 1943.

Few sinkings occur after 1943. which

would leave the author to believe that the U-boats switched to other areas.

The aotlon off the South American coast was similar to the Kiddle
American sons.

The geographic boundary of this sone follows the South

American coast.

This boundary ranges out into the Atlantic from 10°N

A
30°W to 10°S 30°W. ^

However, the author has not accurately kept the

boundary, with regard to 10°N.

The author has ohaaged this, when it was

felt that the sinking waa closer to the South American oosst, and

therefore, warrants being included in this sone.

This violation accounted

for the U-boats U-548, U-572, and U-1062.
In this sone, including the three violations, twelve U-boats were
sunk.

Nine were credited to aircraft, while three were the result of

action by sea craft.

In

1942;,

only U-512 was killed, accounted for by

United States Army Airoraft 99, on November 2, 1942.
of nine were sunk.

In May, 1943, U-128 was destroyed by USS Moffett .

USS Jduett . snd VP-74, Nevy Land-Bssed Air.

May 17, 1943, not May 28, 1943.
with five U-boata being sunk.
United Statea aircraft.

UI
14.
15.
16.

In 1943, a total

16

15

This U-boat was sunk on

July 1943, was again a large month,

These U-bosts were all accounted for by

In 1944, U-106 waa destroyed by the USS Frcssendan,

3ee Appendix 4.
See Chart #3.
U.S. Naval Chronology, p. 50.
See Appendix 5*
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and ia 1945, U-548 by the USS Coffman . USS Boatwiok. and USS Thomas . 17

The

owell

picture shows ths intensity of ths battls in 1943, with

the increased destruction of D-boats in July of 1943.

The Atlantic sone includes the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and
the African Coast Line.

18

In order to arrive at the best possible

discussion ©f the Atlantic battle, two distinct areas have been foranlated.

The line of demarcation is the longitudinal line 30°W.

Group A consists

of all sunk U-boats west of 30°W, while Group B consists of all U-boats

sunk east of 30°W.

Thirty-two U-boats wsre sunk in Area A.

19

craft, while twenty-two were sunk by aircraft.

by the combined air and see units.
killed.

Eight were sunk by sea

U-801 and U-66 were sunk

In 1942 s only one U-boat, U-503, was

In 1943, the number rose to sixteen.

In the first five months,

from January to May, only five U-boats were destroyed.
March, two in May and one in April.

20

Two came in

In June, July, and August, twelve

U-boats were destroyed, with August accounting for six.

There is some

question as to whether U-84 and U-185 were killed on the 24th or 30th
of August.

From September to December five U-boats were sunk, one in

September, two in October, end two in November.

In 1944, six were sunk,

with four being destroyed in the first four months of the year.
1945, five U-boats went to the bottom.

In

Of the total, thirty-two, the

year 1943 accounted for half, with August being the big month, with six
U-boats sunk.
In Area B, east of the demarcation line, 30°W,
were engaged and destroyed by United States Forces.

vF.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See

Appendix 5.
Chart #4*
Chart #4.
Appendix 6.
Chart #4.
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forty-five U-boats
Of thsse forty-five,

3

twelve were sunk by sea craft, and twenty-nine sunk by aircraft, while
four were destroyed in a combined effort.

One of these four, U-6Q4, was

scuttled after being attacked by the USS Moffctfr and VP-129, a Navel
22
Land-Based Aircraft.
In 1942, six submarines were sunk.

All were in the latter part of

the year, except for 0-519, which was destroyed on February 10, 1942.

In 1943, there were twenty-seven sinkings.

In the first four months

only three U-boats were sunk, U-225, U-524, end U- 15 6. 2
and July, there were fifteen sinkings.

In Msy, June,

July had eight of then.

In

the remaining months, ten were accounted for by United States Forces.

The number of submarine sinkings diminished in 1944, ten being sunk,

with five of these in the first four months.
the next three months.

Five more were added in

In 1945, only one U-boat was destroyed, 0-248,

by the combined actions of USS Barter . USS

(Otter.

03S Varian . and USS Hubbard .

The results show a slow rate of sinkings in 1942, with a concentrated
effort in July and August, 1943.
Off the English and European coast damage to the enemy U-boats by

This operational zone included the

United States forces was slight.

coast of Europe and Great Britain, the English Channel, North Sea, Bay

of Biscay, and the Baltic Sea.

Specifically, the area ranged from

60°N 10°W to 40°N 10°W, excluding the Mediterranean Sea and its approaches,

particularly between Spain and Africa.

The operations in this sons accounted for three U-boats by American
forces.

All three were destroyed from the sir.

On November 12, 1943,

U-508 was sunk by VB-102, a Navy Land-Based plane.

22.
23.
24.

U.S. Naval Chronology , p. 59.
See Appendix 7.
See Chart #5.

The other two sinkings

66

occurred in 1945 on the 25th and 30th of April, accounting for U-1007 and
U-1055.

The American forces did not play

a

major role in this sone

of operations.

The Mediterranean zone achieved results which were even less impressive than those of the European sone.

This aone consisted of the

Mediterranean Sea and its passages, from 30°N 0°W, 45°N 0°W to 43°W
45°H, 43°E, 30°N.

by sea craft.

26

Of the two U-boats sunk in this area, both were sunk

U-375 was sunk on July 30, 1943 by the USS PC -624., while

U-73 was killed on December 16, 1943, by the USS Woolsev and USS Trlppe . 27
Although the Mediterranean and European coastal waters did not produce

very large results, the United States Army Air Force bombings on harbors
and the approaches produced better results.

Thirty-three U-boats were lost because of attacks by the United States
Army Air Forces.

These attacks were largely carried out against Pola,

Toulon, Salamis, Bremen, Hamburg, Wilhelms haven, Kiel, and Trondheim.
In 1943 only one U-boat was destroyed in port.

28

In 1944, thirteen

U-boats became the victims of the bombings with seven sunk at Toulon
from February 6, 1844, to August 6, 1944.

This date of February 6 is

questionable since U-380 could have been hit on March 11, 1944.

29

In

1945, nineteen U-boats were sunk between February 24, 1945, and April 4,
1945.

Kiel was hit the hardest, losing ten U-boats.

three and Bremen five, in this same period.

Wilhelmshaven lost

Therefore, the total number

of U-boats sunk by bombing, thirty-three, brings the complete total of

U-boats sunk by American forces to 148.

25~.

26.
27.
28.
29.

Appendix 8a.
Chart #6
Appendix 8b.
Appendix 9.
U. S. Naval Chronology
See
See
See
See

,

p. 80.

o3

On* other U-boat oust be mentioned.

by the

t»SS

U-505 was oaptured on April 6,

Guadalcanal, a baby flattop, in eonjunotion with the

deatroyer PSS Plllaburv?

0

Thla U-boat cannot be recorded as destroyed

but rather vaa plaeed in the possession of United Statea Forces.

Six U-boats have been reported as sunk by United Statea Forces, but
hare also been recorded as sunk by other nationalities*

U-588 vaa

credited to the Canadian Tassels, WctaakicTcn . and Skcenc . 31 While U-761
and U-392 vere accounted for by the British.

The British also sunk U-186,

U-2323 a truck s Bins on July 29, 1944, and destroyed itself. 32

Therefore,

these destroyed U-boats cannot be credited to the American total.

Aircraft appears to have played a predominant role in the destruction
of U-boats.

three.
see.

Of the totsl

14.8,

bombing missions accounted for thirty-

This leaves 115 U-boats that were sunk by air and sea forces at
Aircraft accounted for seventy-four of these U-boats, while sea

craft accounted for thirty-four.

Air /sea attacks destroyed eight U-boata.

Aircraft, therefore, accounted for 63.5% of thoae U-boats sunk at sea.
Thus, the predominant part played by the airplane can be seen.

30.
31.
32.

See Appendix 10.
Groner, Pie Sohlffe, p. 52
Ibid., p. 54.
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VI.

CONCLUSION
"

'There mist be a beginning of any
great matter, but the continuing unto
the end until it be thoroughly
,
finished yields the true <rlory. ,n

-Sir Francis Drake to Lord Walsingham.
17th May, 1587.

The U-boat was defeated by May, 1944the Atlantic Ocean and its approaches.

The U-boat had been driven from

The U-boats had lost the offensive

in May, 1943, because of American improvements on weapons and location

devices.

Even improvements like the schnorkel could not overcome the

American scientific advances.

The U-boats were forced to fight

delaying action until newer U-boats became available.
to save the German naval effort.

a

They came too late

Part of the defeat could be attributed

to German U-boat policy.

German U-boats attempted to sink as many merchant ships as possible,
On April 11, 1943, Admiral Doenitz described

regardless of cargo.

the pitfalls of this policy.

"The submarine war will be a failure if

we don't sink more ships than the enemy is able to build.

11

2

By March, 1943,

the Germans had more U-boats (110) in the Atlantic than ever before.

Yet, May, 1943

-,

brought increased U-boat sinkings.

3

Admiral Doenits

had underestimated the capacity of the United States to build escorts

and devise detection instruments.

destroyed.

The U-boats were discovered and

American successes were possible because of new weapons,

escort craft, and location devices.

The number of sinkings might have been higher if the United States
had not placed so much stress on certain policies.

At the Casablanca

Conference in 1943, the objectives included the bombing of factories in

1.
2.
3.

Roeklll. War at Sea Ill II, p. 251.
Morison, Bsttle of th e Atlantic p. 401,
Ibid ., p. 407.
.

,
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Europe, the plants In whloh U-boats w«re assembled, and the bases
at Brest and Lorient.
It can be seen from the bombing statistics that the bombing
of

shipyards did not affect production greatly/

When questioned at

Nureaburg, Albert Speer, former Reich Minister of Armament and War Pro-

duction, testified that production in the yards was reduced about ten
percent.

By bombing the electrical industry, the Allies hoped that motor

bstteries would be kept from the U-bosts.

Although the accumulator

battery factories at Posen, Vienna, and Hasan vera damaged, the most
important one st Hanover was never touched. ^
meet the needs.

Production continued to

Thus, if the Allies had chosen more appropriate targets,

the U-boat damage by bombing probably would have been greater.

The damage done to the submarine pens such as Lorient and Brest
was slight.

The bombing of the submarine pens during the war inflicted

little damage with only one bomb ever penetrating the Brest

pen/

Therefore,

it seems safe to conclude that the stress placed upon this operation could

have been better used elsewhere.

More stress might have proved profitable

in hunter-killer groups, tracking st sea, attacks on U-bosts in transit,

or

more suitable bombing targets.
In sinking 1A8 U-boats, the United States illustrated the predominant

use of aircraft as a weapon against the U-boat.

Aircraft, land-baaed or

carrier-based, sank 63.5 percent of those U-bosts sunk st see.
33 U-boats (out of IAS) were sunk by bombing missions.

Another

Undoubtedly,

aircraft played an Important role in defeating the U-boat.

In order to make the airplane effective, the invention of deteotion

A.
5.
6.

See Appendix 3.
Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy . Washington, 19A6,
III, p. 275. Hereafter cited as Strategic Bombing . III.
Roskill, War at See . II, p. 352.

.
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device* was necessary.

The German Combs rider of U-boate, Admiral Doenlts,

stated that, "The equipment of radar next to the atomic bomb, was the

deciaive war-winnina: invention."

Another device which was helpful waa

the Magnetic Airborne Detector, but this instrument came out in 1944, after
the main battle hed been won.

Along with radar, the planes proved effective

because of their scoring punch.

The sddition of the torpex depth charges

and rockets anabled aircraft to take their toll.

The U-boat campaign was a challenge to the American people and the

United Statea Navy.

The Navy had to fight in two oceana.

results, 143 U-boats were sunk.

In the final

Although this figure seems small, the

defeat of the U-boat relied upon the patience and vigilance of the men

searching for these U-boats.

The final defeat of the U-boat depended

upon the capacity of the United States to produce aircraft, merchant
vessels, and location devices, which the German economy could not match.

The newspapers attempted to keep up with the number of U-boat sinkings.

During the Phaae One period, the number of reported sinkings in The Sew

York Timea wee 29 U-boats destroyed by American forces.

The number of

U-boets reported sunk by March, 1942, waa far in excess of the number
actually sunk.

Therefore in Phaee One, the public was receiving an over-

estimation of American successes

3

In Phaee Two, The New York Times reporta were considerably below the

actual sinkings.

Prom the period beginning June, 1943, end ending Msreh,

1944, this wss generally true.

The high number of sinkings in September,

1944, could be explained by the feet that press releases on U-boat losses

were e few month* behind.

The public, therefore, rarely received accurate

or up-to-date information on the U-boat war.

It can be said that the

summery of ths results, 151 U-bosts sunk, wss very cloee to being accurate.

7.
3.

Nurembure . XIII, p. 279.
See Graph #1.
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T fn Ft*

iTrtli

TlBftf

attempted to keep the public inforaed about

United Stetee merchant ship loeaea.

There were uaually two types of

preaa releaaea concerning the number of merchantmen eunk.

One waa an

unofficial Associated Preaa ea timet ion and the other waa the official Naval
report.

The reporting of merchant a hip loaaea waa moat prevalent during

Phaae One.

In Phase One, both the official end unofficial reporta were

far below the actual number of ainkinga.

The exception occurred from

September, 1942, to January, 1943, when the Aaaocieted Preaa estimate

waa far in exoesa of the correct number .

Thua, it can be aeen that the

public waa net being well inforaed on U-boat successes.

There aeeas to

have been an attempt by the Government to misinform the public on the

course of the U-boat war.

It la improbable that the discrepancies

between reports and reslities were the result of honest error.

The motivation behind the United States public information policy
was primarily a military concern.

The authorities felt that the various

sctions could not be publicised because it would allow the enemy to
pinpoint United States navsl vessels.

10

tsll the enemy when e U-boat was sunk.

The description would also
It is Improbable that the war

effort could have been affected by the description of anti-submarine
set leas.
In Phsse One, little news wes released on U-boats sunk by United

States craft.

Information could have been piven without indicating

the piece or the names of the unite involved.

In Phaae Two, information

waa given, but it was uaually several months behind the engegeaent.

The

use of the wolfpeek by the enemy enabled the Gerasns to have information
on any U-boat sinkings and United States naval unite.

Therefore, informa-

could have been given to the public without seriously impairing the war effort.

9.
10.

See Graph
"Navy Strikes 'Strong Blows, M

EE.

*CI, 30, 678 (Jsn. 21, 1942), p. 5.
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APPENDIX 2

GERMAN U-BGATS

A.

U-Boata

Speed
1A

IIA

B

3

1200 m

381

AH

a

Under

Arpapant

17.8 knots
8.3

6 torpedo tubes (AB2H)

13.0 knot»
6.9

3 torpedo tubes

13.0 knot*
7.0

1-10.5 flak
1-2 flak

1-2 flak
A-2 flek
3 torpedo tubes
1-2 flak

A-2 flak
A35 *'

12.0 knot!
7.0

3 torpedo tabes
1-2 flak

4-2 flak
12,7 knots

"••

4-

7.

mi

i

16.0 knots

3 torpedo tubes

1-2 flak
A-2 flak
5 torpedo tubes (AB1H)

1-8.8 flak
1-2 flak

B

17.2 knots

1041

5 torpedo tubes (A.l)

1- 3.7 flak
2-2 flak

A

'vi

5 torpedo tubes (A.l)
1-3.7 flak
2- 2 flak
Bines

1070

U

J

1235 *

,U5

r

16.0 knots
7.3

16.9 knots
v.

5 torpedo tubes (A.l)

1- 3.7 flek
2-2 flak
1A mines
5 torpedo tubes U.l)
1- 3.7 flak
2-2 flak
',

1.

Groner, A., Die Sebiffe . pp. 18-22

'

.
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APPENDIX 2 Cont.

Type
3

1480 M
B

18.2 knots

3

1430

1

6 torpedo tubes (4,2)

7.3
C

c

154c

J

40

18.2
7.3
'

2150 »

1-10.5 flak
1-3.7 flak
1-2 fink, 22 mines
ss of 1942

k

2

y.

..

1-3.7 flsk
Imsta

6.9
3

2150 *

2710 ,

I

>s

7.3

3

l

Km

3

19,2 knots
6.9

16 .4 knots

2 torpedo tubes (2H), 66 nines

1-3.7 flak, 4-2 flak
3

4650 *

II

23.0 knots
7.0

8 torpedo tubes (6,28)
4-12.7

2

2- 2 flak, 1 helicopter
]

2300 »

'
1

3

14 .4 knots

4 torpedoes
2-3.7 flak
1-2 flak

3
m
pi

TVTT O
R
Afii

£ 5

irnr-t **

2 torpedoes

21.5

G

3

385 a

2 torpedoes
21.5

'

-

Hi

XVTII

1887

«3

Li.O
SIIW Ww
w knots
16.0

2 torpedoes

3

15.5 knots

6 torpedo tubes (6&)
4-3 flakj

si

JL<S»

24.0

XXI

XX] XI

21U

J

274 m

15.5 knots
17.5

6 torpedo tubes (6b)
4-2 flak , 12 mines
2
4-3 flls,l2» (Vorgesehen)

9.7 knots
12.5

2 torpedo tubes (2B)
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APPENDIX 3

EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON LATE MODEL GERMAN U-BOAT

PRODUCTIONS AND OPERATIONS

1

(of Bombing Alone)

I.

U*Boat Types
A.

B.

1.

2.

Type XXI

Type XXIII

Production
1.

Number ordered (by end of war)

381

95

2.

2
Number produced (by end of war)

202

13

3.

Number denied (by bombing attaok)

60

19

4.

Number actually delivered

119

63

After Commission
1.

Sunk by bombing

15

8

2.

Still in training

91

38

3.

Number not full operational

12

17

U.

Number in Full operation

6

Webster, C, and Frankland, W., Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany,
1939-19A5 . London, 1961, Vol. 17, p. 276.
The number produced was affected by priorities, reallocation of materials,
and manpower.

a

APPBNDK 4
U-BOATS SUNK OFF THE UNITED STATES COAST BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FRCM 50°N 50°W to 40°N 50°y

U-Boat

Pete Sunk

Sunk By

U-174

April 27, 1943

VB-125

Looation Sunk
c

13 35'

JJ

36°18«W

U SS Bakgr . US5

The—

42°16'N
59°49'W

U-233

June 7 a 1944

U-1229

August 20,

U-866

Maroh 11, 1945

USS Love, USS Mender

43°13«N
6l°08'W

U-879

April 19, 1945

USS Buckley . USS Reuben Jones

42°19«n
61°45'W

U-S53

May 6, 1945

USS Atberton . USS Hoberly

41°13«J5

19U

VC-42

(

USS Bogue )

U

42 20«N
51°39»W

71°27«W

80

U-BOATS SUNK IN MIDDLE AMERICAN ZONE BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM 40°N 60°W to 10°N 60°W

U-Boat
5

April

U,

1942

Sunk By

Loeatlon Sunk

U3S Ropaa

35°55'N
75°13'W

U-352

May 9, 1942

USP Icarus

S. Capa Hatteraa

U-157

June 13, 1942

US CG Thatls

?-4°13'N

82°03'W

U-158

Juna 30, 1942

VP-74

32°50«N
67°28'W

U-701

July 7, 1942

USA-396

34°50'N
67°28«W

U-153

July 13, 1942

USA FC-59.USS Lansdevne

U-576

July 15, 1942

VS-9 and US Unicoi1

Off Capa Hattaras

U-166

August 1, 1942

US CG Squadron 212

28°37'N

U-654

August 22, 1942

USAA Squadron 45

North of Colon

U-521

Juna 2, 1943

USS PC-565

37°43'R
73°16«W

U-159

July 15, 1943

VP-32

18°58«N
73°44'W

U-759

July 26, 1943

VP-32

18°56'N
75° tf

U-359

July 28

VP-32

15°57'N
68°30»W

U-615

August 6, 1943

VP-205 ,VP-204* VP-130

12°38'N
64°15 , W

U-550

April 16, 1944

USS Grsndy USS Jolce
PSg Pet arson

40°09«N

1.

Merchant Ship

.

09°56'N
81°29'W

69°U*W

a
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APPENDK

6

U-BQATS SUNK OFF SOOTH AMERICA BY TOUTED
STATES FORCES
FROM 50°K 50*V to 40°N 50°W

U-3pat

Date Sunk

Sunk By

October 2, 1942

TJSAil-99

January 6, 1943

VP-83

January 13, 1943

VP-33

May 17, 1943

HSS Moffat. U3S Jouett

10°00»S
35°35'W

U-590

July 9, 1943

VP-94

03°22'N
48°38tW

U-513

July 19, 1943

VP-74

27°17»S
47 n 34 f W

U-662

July 24, 1943

USAA-VP-74

U-512

U-I64

U-507

U-128

Location Sunk
06°50'N
52°25«W
01°58«S
39°23'W
01°38«S
39°52'W

03°36» V

27°56»W

U-598

July 26, 1943

VP-32

04*05'

33°23'W

U-572

August 3, 1943

VP-205

U-161

September 27, 1943

T7F-74

11°33'N
54°05'W
12°30«S
35 35«W

U-1062

Sentember 30, 1944

Ml

n-548

Aoril 30, 1945

USS Coffaan. P3S Boatviok
end PSS ThofW

Frea aention

11°35»N
0
34 44«W

36°34»W
74 00«W

V
WN
H
wN
H
N

APPENDIX 7

U-BOATS SUNK IN THE ATLANTIC IN AREA A
WEST OF LONGITUDE 30°W

BUtJtedi
U-503

Maroh 15 s 1942

VP-82

45*50«N
*e
*» u

U-130

March 12, 1943

USB ChaaaHn

37*10* N
w

U-175

April 17, 1943

U-657

May

U-569

U,

ft

48*50* N

VP-84

60*10* N

May 22, 1943

VC-9 (UBS Boaue)

50*40'

U-217

Juna 5, 1943

VC-9 (USB Bogue.)

30*18' N
i2 40' V

U-113

June 6, 1943

VC-9 (USS Bo

U-388

June 20, 1943

VP-84 (USS §oguf)

57*36'

U-487

July 13, 1943

VC-13

Cora)

27*15*
3/°lgi
A.U y
If

U-67

July 16, 1943

vc-13 (usg port)

30*05'
IAT.7'¥

U-A3

July 30, 1943

VC-29(|1SS San>e)

34*57*11
34 11« W

U-117

August 7, 1943

VF-205, VP-204, VP-130,
Card) 4 US Boriber 10

39*33N
38°21'W

U-664

August 9, 1943

VC-1 (USS. Cari)

40*12' 1
37 29'

U-525

Auguat

VC-1 (OSS Card)

41*29*

1943

U

t

1943

(USS,

m

)

Cm

30*49'

38 55'W

U-84

August 26, or 24, 1943 VC-13 (USS Cora)

27*09*

37°03*W
27*00* N
37*06* W

U-185

Auguat 26, or 24, 1943 VC-13 (USB Cora)

U-847

Auguat 27, 1943

VC-1 (U3S Zied)

28*19' N
37*58*

U-220

October 27, 1943

VC-1 (USS Plook friend)

48*53*
33 30'

W
V
«
»
1
H

.

S3

APPENDIX 7 Cont
3fonk

3y

vp ~o /nan

Laaatieft tad
r*

ma \

4°.

14*

31 55'W
0-2.0*5

Novubar

1, 1943

'

Borle (Plane ?)
31

Norenber 20, 1943

January 17,

19U

VC-19

(m gogot?

vc-13

(HM(^M)

t

3

U-801

March 16. or 17.19AA VC-6 (OSS Bleak Island)
"ft? Pom* VP? BfTOffltilP.

March 19. 1944

VC-6 (USS Bloak laland)

U?W

20'W

30°28'V
13°10» M

33°44'W

April 26,

May 6,

19U

19U

U-880

April 16, 1945

U-1235

April 15, 1945

U-518

April 22, 1945

uas Frost, U39 Huse,
Ujtg gnowfrn

Mar,

«C~55 (USS B^ocJr. Ideal)
|fff liffHTT

!7 0 «y

3*

ill

WW

17*17'

32°29»W
47*35'
30*26'

791 ^ffltw.
03S Career,

SSfiLfiEfili

m

47*53'

30°26'V

feal A. lastt 43*26'*
38°23'W

n-546

April 24, 1945

USS Flaherty, USS Neunger
VSR, Ch«te,i8. U3S Veria'*.

43*53'

40°O7'W

2m§bS££* USSJ&Lth
0-881

3-490

May 6, 1945
June 12, 1944

BH taaatm

43*18»

USS Frost. USS Inch.
SSSJfeifit* SSLfiroaton

». Atlantic

47*44'

'

W
N
N
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U-BOATS SUNK IN THE ATLANTIC IN AREA B
EAST OT LONGITUDE 30°W

U-Boat

Data Sunk

f.m-ii;

U-464

August 20, 1942

VP-73

61°21«N
n
40»W

U-408

November 5, 1942

VP-84

67*40'
18*32'

U-173

November 16, 1942

USS Woolaey.
USS Swans on. USS Quick

33*40'

58 00* N
W
22 44'W

iv

liUvCI vAUll tfUHft

H

U-611

December 10, 1942

VP-84

U-626

December 15, 1942

USCG Ingham

07°35'W

i<-

27°12'W

U-519

February 10, 1943

USA Squad 2

47*05*1
16*34'

U-225

February 21, 1943

USCG Sneneer

51*25*

27 28'

U-156

March 8, 1943

VP-53

Mid-Atlantic

U-524

March 22, 1943

USA-1

30*15'

18°13»W

U-182

May 15 or 16, 1943

USS Meekenaie

U-467

May 25, 1943

VP-84

33*55'
20*35'
62*25*

U°52'W
U-200

June 24, 1943

-

VP-84

>;>•

28*18'

USA A/S

1

37*40'
ALT
15 30»W

40*37'
13 U'W

U-232

July 8, 1943

USA A/S 2

U-506

July 12, 1943

USA A/S 1
16*30'W

U-160

July 14, 1943

VC-29 fUSS Santee)

33*54'
27*13'

U-509

July 15, 1943

7C-29 (USS Santee)

34*02'
26*02'

U-527

July 23, 1943

VC-9»4SS Bpgue

35*25'
27 56'W

w
NN
W
I
M
W

3
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APPEHDIX 8 Cont.

E ho

Date Sunk

TJ-613

July 23, 1943

USS Badger

35°32«N
28 36'

August 2, 1943

USA A/S 4

46°15«N
10 25'

August 11, 1943

VB-129, VB-107
USS Mof-Putt

U-706

U-6Q4

OUAJL&

(3cuttled)

U-336

DT

c

1

B

05°00«S
<e0

00'

October 4, 1943

VC-9 or VC-128

October 4, 1943

VC-9 (USS Card)

43°18'N
<o 58'

October 13, 1943

VC-9 (USS Card)

48*56'
20 41 "W

U-46O

October 6, 1943

VC-9 (USS Card)

62°43«N

U-378

Octobsr 20, 1943

VC-13 (USS Core)

47^40'

U-848

November 5, 1943

VB-107, USA-1

10°09»S
18°00'W

U-849

November 25, 1943

VB-107

06 30«S

U-86

November 29, 1943

VC-19 (USS Bocue)

39°33'N
19 Ol'V

u-172

December 12, 1943

VC-19 (USS Bocrae)

26°19'N
29 58«W

U-402

,,

?

43°18«N

o

cs^o'w
ft

rtr

n 1 AKB oh
USS Inaraham
TTSS

U-645

December 24. 19/

U-271

v oflUoU T

40 £

'

HM

fla»Ve»—%

VB-103

NOT toll OX JUBOTW
53°15'N
15 52«tf

U Lit

rooruary o*

U-603

Msrch 1, 1944

1*744

VB-107

10°35'S
23°15'W

USS Bronstsln.

48*55'

26°10«V

Thomas^

0
Broruit.4nZ0 in»
26 OO'W

U-704

March 1, 1944

USS

U-515

April 9, 1944

VC-58 (USS Guadalcanal) 3i°35«N
USS Fope„ USS Chatelan. 19 18»W
USS Flabsrty

)

APPENDIX 8 Cont.

U-Boat

:

ita

';..>•

a

May io, 1V44

Sunk By
VC-58 vUS5 Guadalcanal

S3 85'

18°59*W
IT— KLO

nay

xv44

uoo jsumne amora &
USS Ahrana

H Kl
/

us» waKerxeia

31 13*H
23 03«W
<5 J4"a

21°36»W
1C/
U-154

TT

July 3, 1944

USS Inch* & USS frost
19°30«W

U-ooO

July 13, 1944

vc-9. vUSS Salmons.)

-

%m

s5

'

*mmt'•m
•

05 30»W

U-248

January 16, 1945

USS Hayter. USS Otter. 47°43»H
USS Varisn. USS Hubbard 26°37'W

U-857

April 7, 1945

USS Gust arson

49°19»N
10°23'V

U-662

July 24, 1943

VP-94

03°36»N
27°56«W

U-467

May 25, 1943

VP-84

62°25'N
14°52'U

APPENDIX 9
A.

U-BOATS SUNK OFF EUROPEAN COAST BY UNITED STATES FORCES
FROM 60°N 10°W to A0°N 10°W

S3tl3

Bti&JUfc

SsffikjgX

looatloa Sunk

U-503

Ncwaabcr 12, 1943

7I>-103

46°N
£77°30*W

U-1107

April 25, 1945

VPB-107

A8°12'N
o
05 A2'H

D-1055

April 30, 1945

VPB-103

48°S
06°30'«

-

B.

U-BOATS SUNK IN MHJUER&LcffiAN SEA BY UNITED STATES FGRCB?

mm

0°tf

IfcBfiit

45°N to 0°« 30°U

Ssm* By

iaastiaa^fe
36°40»N
12°28'E

U-375

July 30, 1943

USS PC-624

U-73

D»o«tf»r 16, 1943

JSS WoylaT
?2SJ*imS

.

36*07' N

00°50'W

APPENDIX 10

U-BOATS SUNK BY STRATEGIC BCMBING BY USAAF
Location Sunk

U-622

July 14. 1943

* 'J..'!';"
WUVMW4HS

U-81

January 9. 1944

Pola

U-380

February 6 S 1944 or
March 11, 1944

F aulas

u-410

Fabrasry 6, 1944 or
Meroh 11, 1944

Toulon

U-421

April 29, 1944

Foulon

U-586

July 5, 1944

Toulon

U-872

July 29, 1944

U-471

August 6, 1944

Toulon

U-642

July 5, 1944 or
August 6, 1944

Toulon

U--952

August 6, 1944

Toulon

U-969

August 6, 1944

Toulon

U-565

September 24, 1944

-;/.:.,:;

.

r,

U-596

September 24, 1944

'

TJ-3007

February 24, 1945

Bremen

U-2515

March 11, 1945

Hamburg

U-2530

March 11, 1945

Hamburg

U-96

March 30, 1945

Wllhelmehanren

U-429

March 30, 1945

U-3508

March 30, 1945

U-72

March 30, 1945

U-430

March 30, 1945

Bremen

U-329

March 30, 1945

mmm

U-870

March 30, 1945

Bremen

U-884

Maroh 30, 1945

Off Helling

U-2340

March 30, 1945

Hamfctorg

U-348

Maroh

U-1221

April 3, 1945

?,

1945

:

' :

":'";
l

:

>1

:

Wilnelmsheven

:

:-:\

Kiel

:

APPENDIX 10 Cont

U-Boat

Date Sunk

Looation Sunk

U-2542

April 3, 1945

Kiel

U-3505

April 3, 1945

Kiel

U-237

April 4, 1945

Kiel

U-749

April 4» 1945

Kiel

U-3003

April 4, 1945

lie]
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APPENDIX 11

U-BOATS SUNK BY UNITED STATES FORCES IN COOPERATION WITH
OTHER NATIONALITIES

E SsiL

Data Sunk

U-404

July 28, 1943

USA A/S 4 &
British 224 sir

45°53»N
09 25«W

U-576

March 15, 1944

US VC-95 & British 176
& 206 & Canadian

46°18«N
27°34'W

Laaaiilss.

Jhdl

Prlnos Rupert

19U

U-371

May A,

U-94

August 28, 19A2

U-176

May 15, 1943

Cuban SC-13 &
US air 62

North of Harana

U-199

July 31, 1943

USN #74 & Braslllan

23°54'S

USS Pride . USS Campbell 37°49'N
it French Senegslsis &
05 39'E
British Blankner
Caribbean Sea
Canadian Oakrille &
US aircraft

sir

19U

USN Bombing Squad.
103 & 110 &
Cseoh Squad 311

Off Helling

U-996

August,

U-616

May 14, 1944

USS
USS
USS
USS
USS

U-869

February 28, 1945

UBS Fowler & Frenoh
d* Indlacret

U-960

May 19, 1944

USS Niblaok . USS Ludlow
6 British sir

Northwest
Algiers

U-606

February 22, 1943

USS Campbell & Polish
Bursa

North Atlantio

U-593

December 13, 1943

USS Wainwriaht &
British Palps

Nielda . USS GleaTas .
Ellyaon . USS Hillsrr .
P. Jones . USS Maoomb
H amble ton. USS Rodman
Emmons & British air
Mid-i

,

Lsmiie

North Constantine

01
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